Iran's Anti-Imperialism Is a Survival Strategy, Not an Ideology

More than five months into the US-Israel campaign against Iran, the prospect of a deal to end the confrontation remains unclear. Earlier this week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared there were no direct talks with Washington, while hostile rhetoric and calls for revenge continued to echo from Tehran. Some Western commentators, especially those leaning conservative, argue that Iran cannot reach an agreement because of its anti-American ideology. However, that assumption is misguided.

According to analysis, a look at Iran's constitution and recent history reveals that the Islamic Republic is not solely driven by ideology. The regime, in its current form, would not hesitate to strike a deal with the US, even Israel, if it aligns with the guiding principle: the survival of the regime.

The Limits of Iran's Anti-Imperialism

In January 1988, Iran's Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini resolved an internal dispute over the scope of Islamic jurist guardianship by declaring that the Islamic government supersedes all other Islamic rulings, including prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage. The following month, he ordered the creation of a body to resolve deadlocks between parliament and the Guardian Council. A 1989 constitutional amendment formalized this body as Article 112, naming it the Expediency Discernment Council. The message was clear: preserving the system is the supreme religious duty, and a body was established to allow deviations from religious law when the system requires it.

In subsequent years, this principle was clearly applied in the implementation of official ideology, including the hostile stance toward Washington and Tel Aviv. Iran currently presents its anti-imperialist doctrine as a moral commitment rooted in resisting domination, colonialism, and Western hegemony. However, Iran's anti-imperialism is positional rather than universal: it opposes domination when it is the subject, but does not consistently oppose domination as a political relationship in general. The doctrine of 'forward defense' has often treated Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine as arenas for Tehran to deter enemies, project power, and create leverage, making the anti-imperialist principle selectively applied.

Deals with the Enemy

The Islamic Republic speaks the language of principle, respected regardless of cost, but governs by calculating consequences. That gap is not hypocrisy but a structural feature of any state ruling in the name of a doctrine, yet it leaves a perennial problem: how to compromise without appearing to have compromised. History shows this is feasible. In July 1988, Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq, publicly saying it was more poisonous to him than poison. During the war, Tehran accepted US weapons via Israel and secretly dealt with Washington in the Iran-Contra affair. After 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, Iranian and American diplomats cooperated at the Bonn conference to shape the post-Taliban government.

This year, the mechanism operates under much greater pressure. The US and Israeli airstrikes on February 28 killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of a war whose declared aims included forcing regime change in Iran. Within days, the Assembly of Experts appointed his son Mojtaba as successor in a hereditary succession that the republic's doctrine would disdain, marking one more norm abandoned to protect the core. On June 17, President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Islamabad memorandum, which includes ending hostilities, easing sanctions, access to frozen funds, and reconstruction support. Mojtaba Khamenei approved in writing while acknowledging reservations. Although the memorandum leaves many issues unresolved, its existence is significant as the regime accepts a direct deal with Washington.

How can a state engage in such a deal without renouncing the identity that legitimizes itself? By not renouncing anti-imperialism but redefining its meaning. Ali Khamenei provided the vocabulary in 2013 when he spoke of 'heroic flexibility,' borrowing the image of a wrestler stepping back without forgetting the opponent's strength. Concessions become strategic patience, and retreat becomes preserving the struggle. Supporters mostly follow, because where an institution reinterprets its own doctrine, the doctrine cannot bind it. The Islamabad memorandum follows the same logic: anti-imperialism is not abandoned but reinterpreted as preserving Iran's resistance capacity under changed conditions.

Compromise May Save the System but Not Bring Democracy

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in 2015 framed negotiations not as surrender but as another means to protect Iran's interests. The same logic could support a future deal with the US and indirectly Israel, without recognition or reconciliation, if mutual restraint is judged better for the system's survival than continued confrontation. However, the state has invoked wartime conditions to expand arrests, expedite prosecutions, and accelerate executions. That repressive apparatus was not built by sanctions and will not be dismantled when sanctions are lifted. Easing sanctions may reduce hardship for the Iranian people, but without political reform, it might also leave the state with more resources to maintain repressive institutions.

Thus, the usual debate presents a false choice between confrontation that collapses the Islamic Republic and diplomacy that moderates it. A third, more likely possibility exists: a settlement with the US that preserves the system but does not bring it closer to democracy. One form of dominance is loosened; another is consolidated. Iran is better protected from foreign attack; Iranians are no less exposed to their own state. Anyone still asking whether the Islamic Republic would trade hostility for survival should reread Article 112—the answer has been in the constitution since 1989.