Where Do the UAE and Saudi Arabia Stand in Ethiopia's Tigray War?

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As fighting flares again in Ethiopia's Tigray region, threatening to destabilize the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates' open support for Ethiopia's federal government and Saudi Arabia's regional diplomatic record are drawing attention.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed the Ethiopian government, while Saudi Arabia previously helped mend Ethiopia–Eritrea relations and is said to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, the document that ended the war between Ethiopia's federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea raise the risk of a broader confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh partly reflect outside powers' interests in the crisis.

UAE: Clear support, unproven influence

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied armed groups on Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in neighboring Afar and Amhara regions.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE's minister of state, expressed solidarity with the Ethiopian government and people, reaffirmed support for the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria agreement.

The statement sets out Abu Dhabi's public position clearly: backing Ethiopia's federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It does not confirm whether the UAE is providing military aid or has secured a commitment from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates the port of Berbera in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 links that port to the UAE's Jebel Ali, creating another corridor for goods bound for inland destinations such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial ties partly explain Abu Dhabi's interest in regional stability and its relations with Addis Ababa. They do not, however, prove that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia's military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its ties with the federal government to encourage a political solution to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, unclear level of engagement

Saudi Arabia has not yet announced a position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

According to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, the kingdom has not commented publicly on the renewed war, although earlier this year it mounted diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between Ethiopia's federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House cited sources as saying Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by the German research institute SWP argued that Saudi Arabia's earlier mediation efforts failed, partly because the talks did not address Ethiopia's interest in Eritrea's port of Assab.

The kingdom's broader regional stance is also noteworthy. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as siding with Eritrea, against Ethiopia's Red Sea access ambitions.

This is an assessment of regional alignments, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military aid to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has strong interests in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and for its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt–Ethiopia rivalry complicates regional tensions

Egypt's role in the crisis is shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its increasingly close ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that governance and security in the Red Sea belong to the states along the shipping lane, a view Asmara shares. The issue is adding to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable sea access.

In September, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, chief of staff of Ethiopia's military, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups opposed to the federal government, including the TPLF.

Remarks reported by Al Jazeera on September 28 came without evidence backing the accusation. Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nader Zaki later reaffirmed Cairo's commitment to national sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting the suggestion that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation that Egypt is backing the TPLF.

Even so, ties between Egypt and Eritrea have become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to the Egyptian presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting pointed to closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not confirm that either country is involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia is not limited to Tigray but also involves the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Ties with Eritrea and disagreements with Addis Ababa are part of the broader regional backdrop, but not evidence that Egypt is directly involved in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the fighting remains an open question.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risk does not stop at Tigray. Ethiopia's push for sea access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable sea access is a national priority, while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of sending troops across the border and backing armed groups. Eritrea denies this and has called on the UN Security Council to intervene. The accusations remain contested, but the deterioration in relations has sharply raised the stakes of the renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, hamper humanitarian access and disrupt trade and regional security. It would also test whether outside partners can encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side's military aims.

The UAE's close ties with Addis Ababa could open a channel for diplomatic dialogue, while Saudi Arabia's regional diplomatic record offers potential for new talks. However, the public evidence available does not confirm that either country is leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by results

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be seen as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one publicly backs Ethiopia's federal government while the other's current position is less clear. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be judged on whether it can help deliver concrete steps toward de-escalation, a restart of political dialogue and a cooling of Ethiopia–Eritrea tensions. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements can create openings for engagement, but they are no substitute for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria agreement remains the framework for a political solution in Tigray, but the renewed fighting shows how hard it is to sustain peace when the underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement must above all be decided by the parties themselves. Outside partners can contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE's public position sides with Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia's diplomatic record offers different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a substantive contribution to de-escalation has yet to be answered.