Taliban's Five Years in Power: Achievements, Failures, and Challenges Ahead

Five years ago, Taliban fighters entered Kabul in a victorious blaze, nearly two decades after their first government collapsed following the U.S.-led invasion. As American and allied forces hastily withdrew, chaos and a bombing claimed the lives of nearly 200 Afghans.

Today, Kabul is no longer a city of chaos with bomb-proof walls and armored convoys blocking traffic. The city is cleaner, calmer, and learning to live again.

What the Taliban have achieved

During their first stint in power from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban failed to control all of Afghanistan. Resistant provinces became bases for the U.S. and its allies to fight them. This time, the Taliban seem determined not to repeat that mistake. They control all of Afghanistan and have maintained relative security—a notable feat given the threat posed by the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the final years of the U.S.-backed government.

The Taliban have significantly weakened ISKP and now face no major insurgency challenge. Afghans can travel to areas once nearly inaccessible without fear for their lives. For a country where even moving within the capital was once dangerous, this is a considerable achievement.

The economic picture is more complex. In the two decades before the Taliban's return, economic activity largely depended on international aid, while corruption and instability undermined the economy. An economy reliant on foreign support was bound to suffer when most of that support vanished overnight.

But the Taliban have kept Afghanistan's economy from collapsing despite the major shock of 2021. Improved security has allowed more economic activity, including extraction of natural resources. Returning refugees brought capital and business investment. Better tax and customs collection has boosted domestic revenues, while Afghans abroad continue to send billions of dollars home.

Better relations and increased trade with neighboring countries, especially in Central Asia, have also helped. The Taliban administration is undertaking major infrastructure projects such as the Qosh Tepa canal, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, and expanding the electricity grid with Uzbekistan.

However, the Taliban government remains opaque about public finances and refuses to strengthen state institutions, limiting its ability to address structural issues like accountability and corruption.

What has gone wrong

The Taliban's biggest failure is their social policies. The past five years have seen a series of decrees restricting women and girls, cementing Afghanistan's reputation as the world's most extreme example of gender exclusion. The fact that Afghan girls cannot receive formal modern education beyond sixth grade is shameful for society and damaging to the economy.

The consequences are increasingly hard to ignore. Afghanistan is short of female doctors, teachers, and female professionals. The contradiction is stark: Taliban leaders claim schools are not safe enough for girls, while the country increasingly needs women to take on essential jobs they are not trained for.

The quality of education overall has also declined due to less focus on retaining qualified teachers. Meanwhile, religious schools have proliferated and seem to be the administration's preferred model of education. Religious education has a legitimate place in Afghan society, but it cannot replace the modern education system.

Central to these policies is the expansion of the morality police—the idea that the state should govern areas of life people once considered private. This has not only changed how Afghans live but also deepened the rift between the government and the broader population.

The Taliban have also failed to make the government more inclusive of other groups in society. Even within the movement, Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada has sidelined many prominent figures. Several who negotiated and signed the Doha agreement have been removed from influential positions.

Internationally, the Taliban have not gained the recognition they desire. There have been moments of engagement; neighboring and European countries maintain working relations with Kabul, but formal recognition remains elusive. As long as restrictions on education and women's rights persist, Afghanistan will remain isolated from much of the international community.

What lies ahead

For now, the Taliban appear firmly in control. There is no viable military threat, the political opposition is deeply divided, and the international community has neither the will nor the resources for another regime-change effort in Afghanistan.

A greater danger to the Taliban may come from something less direct: simmering public discontent. A government can survive prolonged opposition, but it becomes vulnerable when ordinary people feel so alienated that they grow indifferent to forces seeking to overthrow it—whether foreign or domestic insurgents.

The Taliban's current stability should not be mistaken for a permanent political solution. Five years after their return, they have secured Afghanistan but still haven't answered the fundamental question: what kind of state do they intend to build? International isolation and growing public alienation are a recipe for an impending disaster. Some within the Taliban may see this. The question is whether those who recognize the need for change are willing to stand up against the concentration of power that brought the movement to this point.

Something will have to give.