Malaysia Hosts Myanmar's Min Aung Hlaing: A Welcome or a Complicity in Injustice?

On October 8, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim presided over an official welcome ceremony for Myanmar Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing in Putrajaya, complete with a military honor guard and an official luncheon. It was the first visit by a Myanmar military leader to Malaysia since the 2021 coup. Nine days earlier, Malaysia had deported 1,476 Myanmar nationals by sea as the first phase of a plan to repatriate 5,000 people.

Kuala Lumpur calls this "pragmatic diplomacy." In reality, the move props up the trend of retreating from international accountability mechanisms by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, weakening the legal system and institutions on which small states depend most.

Domestic pressure

Since May, a wave of hate speech and online disinformation targeting the Rohingya community — Malaysia's largest refugee group — has surged. By late July, at least nine Rohingya community schools had closed or faced closure orders. More than 100 Rohingya told UNHCR that residents of Penang village had driven them out.

The hostility ignores a key fact: Malaysia's police chief has said Rohingya account for only 0.02% of crimes. Yet research by INITIATE.MY and the Centre for Organised Hate Research found that AI-generated content is amplifying anti-Rohingya disinformation across Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh, portraying refugees as a threat and legitimizing vigilante violence.

Electoral politics also plays a role. After heavy defeats in three state elections and with a general election expected before February 2028, Anwar's coalition may see a hard line on Rohingya repatriation as a way to project control, though voter frustration and right-wing rivals make the electoral payoff unpredictable.

Accountability evasion spreads

Malaysia is not acting alone. Mongolia hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2024 despite an ICC arrest warrant, and Hungary hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2025 despite another warrant. Kuala Lumpur denies that the reception amounts to formal recognition, but Anwar says Malaysia will work to fully reintegrate Myanmar into ASEAN, and Min Aung Hlaing wants a seat at the ASEAN summit in Manila in November.

Each such reception makes the next one easier, while sending a message to leaders accused of atrocities — from Netanyahu to Min Aung Hlaing — that diplomatic rehabilitation is possible without accountability.

ASEAN tried this approach before. In April 2021, Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the Five-Point Consensus, then ignored it: violence continued, the ASEAN special envoy never met Aung San Suu Kyi, and inclusive dialogue never began. The bloc's only real leverage was excluding military leaders from summits. Myanmar expert Arkar Hein said: "Welcoming him back without demanding anything rewards that defiance and tells Naypyidaw that time and a staged election can achieve what compromise should have required. Each handshake abroad also makes the regime less willing to make real concessions to its opponents, and convinces them that only the battlefield will decide Myanmar's future."

Questions of consistency

Malaysia has spent decades building a reputation as a regional peacemaker — a hard-won reputation now at risk. It has supported the Bangsamoro peace process since 2001, helping negotiate a landmark peace deal in the southern Philippines, and has backed talks in southern Thailand since 2013.

In November 2024, Anwar welcomed the ICC arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Israel's former defense minister, saying they "should be arrested even if they are visiting other countries." That same month, ICC prosecutors sought an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing over alleged crimes against humanity targeting Rohingya, and an Argentine court later issued a separate arrest order.

Gambia's genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) focuses on the 2016-2017 campaigns commanded by Min Aung Hlaing, which killed thousands of Rohingya, included mass rape and the burning of hundreds of villages, and drove more than 700,000 people into Bangladesh. United Nations investigators have called for him to face genocide charges. Malaysia is not a member of the Rome Statute and has no legal obligation to arrest him. But its reputation as a peacemaker and its stance on Palestine require applying one standard to all.

Repatriation without safeguards

The repatriations rest on assurances that no independent body can verify. UNHCR says it was not involved in the returns and has no access to verify that they were voluntary, and it argues that safe conditions do not exist. Those deported reportedly included 27 children.

Although not a party to the Refugee Convention, Malaysia is still bound by the customary principle of non-refoulement, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar has warned of significant risks.

Naypyidaw says no Rohingya are involved because it does not recognize them as citizens, but other returnees also face arbitrary detention, prosecution, and forced recruitment. The military does not even control Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army holds more than 90% of the territory. On September 28, a day before the repatriations began, an alleged military airstrike killed at least 50 civilians there, following more than a dozen other mass killings by the military earlier this year.

The military-backed administration also cannot deliver the peace needed for safe repatriation. Its election will not include voting in 67 of 330 townships, and when Min Aung Hlaing offered peace talks in April, the National Unity Government (NUG) and major ethnic armed groups refused. Without a ceasefire and an inclusive political process, safe-return guarantees are empty.

Yet Malaysia's frustration is legitimate. It has hosted refugees for decades with little international support, and resettlement has shrunk since the Trump administration suspended U.S. refugee admissions in January 2025. But a failure to share the burden cannot justify repatriation without safeguards.

Pressure on the court

The ICC exists so that victims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity can find justice when their own states fail. That mission now faces unprecedented pressure. On October 9, hours after former ICC judge Navi Pillay won the Nobel Peace Prize, the Trump administration sanctioned the court itself. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Venezuela have announced withdrawals from the ICC.

Yet middle powers can push back. Seventy-nine ICC members, including Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, backed the court after the first U.S. sanctions in February 2025, and by May Hungary's new government had reversed its predecessor's withdrawal decision. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines extradited former President Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague, and on October 8 judges ruled him fit to stand trial for crimes against humanity, with hearings expected to begin on November 30.

Middle powers should say no

Middle powers like Malaysia, along with blocs such as ASEAN and the European Union, cannot stop U.S. sanctions, but they do not have to follow the Trump administration. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told the World Economic Forum in January: middle powers "must act together, because if we are not at the table, we will be on the menu."

Malaysia and its neighbors should lead by saying no: no to efforts to weaken the court, no to treating Min Aung Hlaing's presidency as a blank slate, and no to repatriating Rohingya into an ongoing conflict. Malaysia should support efforts to hold him accountable if ICC judges issue an arrest warrant, and consider joining the Rome Statute — a step it abandoned in 2019.

Saying no does not mean withdrawing. Kuala Lumpur should tie Myanmar's reintegration into ASEAN to real progress on the Five-Point Consensus, starting with an end to violence and inclusive dialogue that includes the NUG and ethnic armed organizations. Domestically, it should pause repatriations until an independent body confirms that returns are safe and voluntary, and hold accountable those who drive out, threaten, or attack refugees.

Malaysia should not bear this responsibility alone. ASEAN partners, members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and donors should fund refugee registration, education, and integration, and resettlement countries should restore their commitments. The government should also hold technology platforms accountable for amplifying anti-refugee disinformation and demand swift action against incitement.

For years, Malaysia has provided shelter to Rohingya and others fleeing Myanmar when few countries did. That record gives it both standing and a responsibility to protect the international justice system it has long pursued.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.