Hormuz War: What Exit for America?

More than five months after the US launched its airstrike campaign against Iran in late February, President Donald Trump's administration still has not found a way out of the conflict. The intermittent bombing has not subdued Tehran, and threats of a larger military campaign have also failed to achieve their purpose.

Pressure is mounting on Washington from multiple fronts: critical weapons stockpiles are dwindling, public approval ratings are falling sharply ahead of the midterm elections, and the global economic crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is worsening. Scarce supplies of goods are pushing the world toward recession.

Notably, the US administration's priorities have shifted. Initially, the goal was to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program, including halting uranium enrichment and handing over 440 kg of highly enriched uranium. After Iran responded by threatening and controlling traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—something the US did not anticipate and had no effective response to—Washington's priority shifted to reopening the strait as soon as possible.

Although the US military budget is more than 100 times larger than Iran's, the US military still cannot prevent Iran from maintaining a threat to ships passing through the strait. The Trump administration once threatened to expand targets to Iran's civilian energy facilities. At a cabinet meeting on July 31, Trump declared he would strike Iran very hard until it could not bear it. However, just a day later, he backed down, perhaps realizing that stronger attacks would not force Iran to surrender.

Analysts point out that the new leadership of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) believes the US and Israel seek to eliminate the Islamic Republic, and therefore any concession to US pressure would only invite more pressure. If the US escalates, the likely outcome is not Iran's capitulation but major retaliatory strikes on Gulf states' infrastructure.

The Least Bad Option

The US administration currently does not trust diplomacy with Iran and tends to use force, whether through tariffs, sanctions, or bombing. Even if an agreement is reached on the strait, Washington will find it difficult to negotiate an effective nuclear deal, as previous nuclear talks lasted up to five years (2010–2015).

In this context, analysts suggest the least bad option is to let Article 5 of the Islamabad Memorandum, signed in June, be implemented. This provision stipulates that Iran will hold dialogue with Oman to determine the management mechanism and maritime services at the Strait of Hormuz, together with other coastal states, in accordance with international law.

The ongoing Iran-Oman negotiations are seen as the best opportunity to resolve the issue. The US only needs to provide information to Oman when necessary and ratify the final agreement. Such an agreement could include the US lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports, which Tehran has linked to reopening the strait.

The outcome of these talks is difficult to predict, but it is clear that Oman and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have better skills and motivation to negotiate with Iran than the US does. The two sides have significant differences: the Gulf states want to return to the pre-war status quo, while Iran wants to establish a new order in which it controls maritime flow through the strait, possibly in coordination with Oman. Given Iran's strategic advantage, it may achieve its goals in the short term, including collecting fees from passing ships.

Even if an agreement is reached, it will be fragile. Maritime traffic will hardly return to pre-war levels, US bases and sanctions will remain, and Iran will rebuild its defense industry to prepare for the next attack. This is probably the best-case scenario, leaving behind a war that brought not peace but only economic suffering, regional instability, and a significant loss of US prestige.