Yemen: Two Scenarios for the War After Houthi Attacks

Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia have pushed the war in Yemen to a new level. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including airports, killing at least a dozen people and wounding hundreds, has eroded the "red lines" that once limited the scope of escalation.

It is a reckless gamble by the Houthis that offers them no benefit. They knew retaliation would be fierce, yet they continued striking Saudi Arabia to serve Iran's agenda, which seeks to heighten tensions ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.

With that escalatory momentum, the current situation is likely to unfold along one of two paths: a large-scale, region-wide campaign against the Houthis, or a war of attrition.

Scenario one: A unified front against the Houthis

To counter the Houthi escalation, Saudi Arabia is working to rally maximum international support while strengthening regional and international alliances. The goal is to forge a unified front capable of confronting what has become a regional threat.

Riyadh is certainly looking to its Gulf neighbors, which are also affected by the ongoing regional conflict. There is a shared perception that everyone faces serious danger, not just Saudi Arabia.

As a result, the Gulf states — with the possible exception of Oman — are expected to back Riyadh both directly and indirectly in the fighting in Yemen.

Pakistan and Turkey are also likely to join this front, having signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia known as the Mecca Pact. The pact is expected to be ratified by Turkey's parliament within days, paving the way for the deployment of Turkish troops in support of Saudi Arabia. Indirect Turkish and Pakistani involvement, along with logistical and intelligence support, appears already to be under way.

U.S. intervention is also possible, though unlikely before the American midterm elections, since military operations in the Middle East remain unpopular with U.S. voters.

A region-wide coalition could help support the counteroffensive by forces loyal to Yemen's internationally recognized government, which is already under way. That could generate the momentum needed to retake the western coastal areas, including territory beyond Bab al-Mandeb and Dhubab.

Such gains could ease pressure on Red Sea shipping and potentially shift the military balance in the government's favor. Opening additional fronts in other Yemeni cities and provinces could stretch Houthi forces, disperse their resources and increase the government's chances of further advances.

Recapturing Sanaa may also be within reach. The main obstacle slowing the government's effort to retake the city is internal disagreement among factions within the government itself, compounded by negative outside interference that deepens rifts and weakens the collective effort against the Houthis.

Recent government measures, particularly efforts to unify decision-making and strengthen the command of military operations, have produced clear progress on the ground. Still, achieving the ultimate goal of retaking Sanaa will require sustained effort and focused determination.

If government forces achieve significant gains, that could force the Houthis to make concessions in exchange for a pause in the fighting. They have done so before. Their aim is not to seek peace but to gain enough space to regroup and eventually return to combat. Negotiators should bear that in mind when approaching talks with the Houthis.

Scenario two: A war of attrition

If the Saudi-led coalition and Yemen's government fall into division and internal disagreement, progress against the Houthis could stall. That would allow Houthi fighters to hold their positions while stepping up pressure on the strategic town of Taiz and sustaining their campaign against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.

Such a course could complicate the conflict, increase civilian casualties and displacement, and prolong the war without producing a decisive military outcome.

It would carry a significant economic cost for Saudi Arabia and complicate its development goals, as it would have to prioritize defense spending.

The rest of the Gulf economies would also be hit, since Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the region. Moreover, losing ground to the Houthis means the crisis at the Strait of Hormuz would also continue, disrupting energy exports from the region.

In this scenario, Yemen would fall into a "no winner, no loser" stalemate, but Iran would emerge as the victor. A war of attrition along the Red Sea coast would give Tehran considerable breathing room, allowing it to ease pressure on its own war efforts.

That would let Iran use the "Houthi card" as leverage in its on-and-off talks with the international community, boosting its confidence to raise its conditions and demands in those negotiations.

This means the only way to resolve the crisis in Yemen is decisive military action led by the Yemeni government and backed by a region-wide coalition. For that to happen, the government must settle its internal problems and its relations with allies.

The views in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.