Ukraine and Europe Have Few Options but to Work With Trump

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy voiced his frustration on Wednesday: "It is painful when President [Donald] Trump picks a side, and it is not ours." The remark came as a diesel deal the US president extended to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin heightened tensions between Washington and both Ukraine and its European allies.

On top of that, reports of Starlink/Starshield service disruptions over two days, October 13–14, hampered Ukraine's military. Service was later restored, and claims that the restriction was ordered by the White House to pressure Kyiv remain unconfirmed. Even so, the two episodes reinforce the impression of a widening rift between Ukraine and the United States. On Friday, Zelenskyy accused Washington of continuing to scale back Starlink service and promised new concessions to Russia.

Still, the next moves bear watching. Trump has previously leaned toward Moscow — notably at his August 2025 summit with Putin in Anchorage, Alaska — before swinging back to conditional support for Ukraine when Russia dug in and after diplomatic efforts by Kyiv and Europe. The arrangement under which Europe pays for US weapons to be sent to Ukraine is still functioning, and the US continues to share intelligence with Kyiv, though reports say some key information is being withheld.

The White House has also withdrawn proposals to recognize Crimea as Russian territory in practice (put forward under an April 2025 peace framework) and to demand that Kyiv pull out of the entire Donbas region. Ukraine and Europe, for their part, continue to back Trump's diplomatic overtures to Moscow, led by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The diesel deal may yet collapse over bipartisan opposition in Congress, including from Republican senators. Washington's latest tilt toward Moscow may therefore matter less than it currently appears.

None of this means Ukraine and its main European allies can afford to be complacent. They have plenty of reasons for concern beyond Trump's unpredictability.

First is Putin's determination to escalate the war. Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure are under daily attack from ballistic missiles and upgraded jet drones, while the country's air defenses struggle. Ukraine is bracing for another punishing winter. Alongside this runs a propaganda war, fueled by the diesel deal.

Unlike Ukraine, Russia never accepted Trump's partial ceasefire proposal covering strikes on energy facilities. Yet Moscow now casts Kyiv as the saboteur after Ukrainian attacks resumed, including a strike on the Ryazan oil refinery on Thursday that Trump called "a disgrace."

Fighting has spilled onto NATO's eastern flank, with Ukrainian grain vessels in the Black Sea attacked inside Romanian waters. Russia is expanding hybrid attacks across Europe aimed at disrupting weapons and ammunition supplies to Ukraine and swaying public opinion in key countries such as Germany by sowing fear. In some parts of the European Union, there is an appetite to re-engage with Moscow. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has confirmed that a Slovak-Russian intergovernmental economic commission will resume work. His Bulgarian counterpart, Rumen Radev, praised Trump's "diesel diplomacy," even as Russian drones struck near Bulgaria's Black Sea coast.

Paying for Ukraine is another headache for Europe. The 90 billion euro ($101 billion) loan the EU approved in April could run dry before the end of 2027. Some estimates suggest Kyiv will need another 70 billion euros ($79 billion) for defense and civilian needs in 2027. That threatens to open bitter disputes among EU member states, which are already negotiating the bloc's 2028–2034 budget.

While some voices call for deep spending cuts, the contentious question of whether aid to Ukraine should come from Russian financial assets frozen in Europe is returning with force. Trump is also calling for part of that money to be released. The debate is unfolding ahead of several major elections, notably France's presidential vote in April and May, as well as contests in Spain, Italy and Poland.

Despite Europe's fragility, it is notable that diplomatic and financial support for Ukraine remains fairly steady. "This is not the time to withdraw support for Ukraine. This is not the time to lift sanctions on Russia," European Council President Antonio Costa said on Friday alongside Zelenskyy and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels. "If we fall, 20 million Ukrainians will come to Europe," Zelenskyy reminded them. "Be strong, protect our country."

Ahead of the summit, the EU opened two negotiating clusters on accession with Ukraine and imposed a fresh round of sanctions on Russia. Zelenskyy arrived in Brussels after talks with UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham and King Charles III in London on Wednesday.

But the EU and Britain cannot do much more than they already are. They have replaced the US as Ukraine's main international backers and, in effect, as guarantors of the country's survival. EU membership — or at least a close integration partnership like Norway's — is the best long-term scenario for Kyiv.

At the same time, Europe lacks the political weight and military capacity to replace the US in the short term. This is starkly visible on the battlefield. Although top European intelligence agencies can give Ukraine some data, there is no EU substitute for Starlink. Europe cannot supply enough air defense systems and interceptors to repel Russian attacks without US support. Faced with US unreliability, Europe is investing in these capabilities in pursuit of strategic autonomy, but even in the best case such efforts will take a decade to bear fruit.

Most importantly, Europeans have few levers to bring Putin to the table. To be sure, there may be positive incentives such as sanctions relief and restored oil and gas flows. But any Russian response is likely to require some form of pressure. The US has so far failed to move Putin — and under Trump has shifted from stick to carrot, offering all manner of "deals" blending diplomacy and business. Part of that failure stems from fear of escalation with another nuclear power; part from the current US administration's opportunism. But the core problem is that there is little reason to expect Europe could do better.

Given all this, both Zelenskyy and the Europeans are likely to fall back on a familiar approach: try to keep Trump on side and smooth over disagreements as much as possible. They are probably hoping and praying that the White House's current opening to Russia fades after the midterm elections. They will also tell Trump that the best way to secure his legacy is to stand firm against Moscow — a view backed by Republican Party members. The strategy is to wait: first through the winter, then through Trump's presidency.

The views in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.