Ukraine Faces Harsh Winter Amid Fighting and Energy Crisis

As winter closes in, Russia has lifted its ban on diesel exports and is preparing to sell hundreds of thousands of tons to the United States and other countries. The move is part of an agreement negotiated between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which led the US Treasury to issue a sanctions exemption for Russian fuel.

The deal comes as global supply and energy prices spiral. For Trump, the political stakes matter more: he announced the agreement just weeks before US midterm elections, when Republicans risk losing their majorities in both chambers of Congress.

Trump turning to Putin, and the Russian leader being able to deliver, reflects Russia's pivotal role in global energy markets. But it also shows the White House is willing to set aside an ally in a weak position – in this case Ukraine – to serve domestic interests.

It is unclear whether the deal marks a turning point in the US approach to the war in Ukraine. The fate of last year's Anchorage agreement suggests caution is warranted. Trump's sudden mention of an "energy ceasefire" – which Russia did not accept – after the deal appears to be the US president's way of balancing a gesture toward Moscow with one meant to reassure Kyiv and Europe.

Either way, America's two-faced stance does little to help Ukraine and its European allies as they grapple with an energy crisis and continuing losses.

The conflict was never only about the battlefield. When the US-led West declared in spring 2022 that "strategically defeating Russia" was its top goal, it hoped sanctions would "turn the ruble into rubble," as then-US President Joe Biden put it, crippling Russia's economy and leading to military collapse. As is well known, that did not happen.

Now Ukraine and its European allies face another difficult winter, testing their endurance to keep up a war of attrition.

Their strategy – escalation through heavy air campaigns against targets deep inside Russian territory – has also failed. The hope was that Russians, once directly affected by the war, would rise up and force the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire, giving Ukraine the breathing room it needs. The result was the opposite: support for Kremlin policy rose rather than fell.

In retaliation for that campaign – which Putin admitted costs Russia 1 percent of GDP – the Russian military launched its own. It dropped some self-imposed restraints and began striking targets it had previously avoided, such as cargo ships entering and leaving Ukraine, bridges over the Dnieper River and data centers.

Some observers wonder whether, for Russia, this is a way to "escalate to de-escalate" – six to nine months of intense fighting combined with ground gains could bring the conflict to an end.

Indeed, Ukraine's economy is suffering severe damage. Black Sea ports can no longer handle wheat exports; the steel industry has halted production; rail logistics are disrupted by a shortage of working locomotives.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is not only attacked daily but almost continuously by drones and missiles. The outlook for the Ukrainian capital this coming winter is grim. Local authorities have begun urging residents to leave because winter preparations such as backup heating and stockpiles of food and water may not be enough to get through the cold months.

Yet Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains as resolute as ever. For him, there is no way back. If he agreed to withdraw troops from the rest of Donetsk as Putin demands, he would have to fear for his life. If a new presidential election were held in Ukraine, he would clearly lose. If he loses, his patrons will abandon him – just as they did with figures like Mikheil Saakashvili, the former Georgian president now serving time in a Tbilisi prison.

Ukraine's political class has grown somewhat more uneasy recently, but it is not split with Zelenskyy over war and peace. Domestic nationalists and Western sponsors are adamant that the war will continue.

For Europe in particular, this war is not about Ukraine but about Russia. The current opportunity to use the country that was once the second-largest republic of the former Soviet Union to weaken Russia – Europe's historic rival – is too tempting to pass up. Europe, which pays half of Kyiv's budget, appears to think it can keep fighting "to the last Ukrainian," hoping to kill more Russians and paralyze their country.

This is not to soothe the supposed looming Russian threat, which is a diversion. Russia is precisely the enemy at the gate that the EU needs to keep itself united. Military Keynesianism is a way to restart the economy, and labeling political opponents as "Putin's henchmen" is extremely convenient.

Beyond that, some EU and NATO members are quietly pursuing historical revanchism: Germany over Hitler's defeat in 1945, Poland over repeated partitions, Sweden over Russia ending its great-power status, Britain over losing its empire, and so on.

Ultimately, after investing hundreds of billions in Kyiv, Europe will not retreat in Ukraine until financial and political losses begin to outweigh the benefits of using Ukraine as a proxy. Or until a version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis brings them to their senses.

Russia's tested endurance in this war surpasses Ukraine materially and Europe non-materially, which may well determine what happens next.

Both Ukraine and Europe will likely survive the coming winter – despite all losses, shortages and suffering. They will live to fight another day – meaning another year or two (or less, as Putin recently suggested) – but in the end Kyiv is certain to lose, and Europe will have to grudgingly accept its ally's defeat while pretending that the survival of a rump Ukrainian state is some kind of victory.

The views in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.