Sudan Cannot Afford to Reject Dialogue Opportunity

After more than three years of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan urgently needs a political solution. The fighting has caused enormous suffering, and a purely military solution cannot rebuild the state or heal a fractured society. In this context, any effort to encourage dialogue among Sudanese themselves deserves serious consideration rather than outright rejection.

In August, a self-appointed committee of 19 Sudanese public figures, chaired by Ahfad University Chancellor Qasim Badri, launched an initiative to prepare the ground for national dialogue inside Sudan. Its members had earlier met SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and called for the lifting of legal restrictions on opposition politicians. Authorities subsequently issued a decree dropping some politically motivated charges against Sudanese abroad returning to take part in the dialogue and granting participants temporary legal protections. These are limited but important confidence-building measures.

The initiative, however, has run into strong opposition. The civilian coalition Sumoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Ta’sis, a coalition in which the RSF participates, have rejected the internal dialogue proposal. They question the initiative’s independence and warn that holding talks in military-controlled areas could legitimize al-Burhan’s power and entrench the country’s division. These concerns are legitimate and deserve serious attention. But the committee says it does not seek to negotiate Sudan’s future or set the agenda for a national dialogue. Its role is to help create the conditions for Sudanese political actors to engage directly with one another. The question is whether the committee can fulfill that role without allowing one party to the conflict to dominate the process. Rejecting the initiative before it has a chance to prove its worth would be premature.

The country’s political actors and civil society organizations remain deeply divided, previous reconciliation efforts have failed, and the war continues to make inclusive political participation increasingly difficult. The committee’s initiative is an attempt to break the deadlock. Preparations for political dialogue should not be postponed until the fighting stops. Securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access are urgent priorities, but groundwork for political dialogue can proceed in parallel with those efforts.

The committee members were not elected and do not represent every political constituency. Even so, the committee’s legitimacy cannot be judged solely by how it was formed; it must also be judged by whether it can help bring more political actors into a national dialogue.

Good intentions alone cannot resolve concerns about credibility. Political dialogue can only succeed if participants believe the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy needed to advance a political opening is not necessarily the same as the legitimacy needed to negotiate a national settlement, but even a preparatory initiative must earn the trust of those it seeks to bring together.

The committee’s meeting with al-Burhan was a practical necessity. As army commander and head of the Sovereignty Council, he has the ability to meet the committee’s demands for legal protection. Engaging with al-Burhan does not in itself mean endorsing his power. But if the initiative becomes too closely tied to the military, other political actors may see it as an extension of al-Burhan’s political agenda rather than an independent broker. The committee must therefore demonstrate that its outreach extends beyond the military establishment and that it is willing to work with political forces opposed to it.

The initiative was launched in Khartoum, which is under military control. This raises legitimate concerns about whether a process begun on territory controlled by one party to the war can win the trust of political forces across the country. A national dialogue cannot be confined to one geographic or political constituency. All regions have experienced different realities of war, governance, displacement and insecurity. The committee must find ways to reach people living outside military-controlled areas, including Sudanese displaced by the fighting, and ensure they can participate freely and without intimidation.

Sumoud and Ta’sis’s decision to reject the initiative does not automatically invalidate the process. Their concerns need to be addressed, but outright rejection at this early stage risks closing off an opportunity for political participation. At the same time, their absence matters. Sudan’s crisis is too deep and complex to be resolved by any single political current. The committee cannot expect every stakeholder to immediately support the initiative, but it must create conditions to persuade reluctant actors to take part. If it fails to do so, the initiative itself will fail.

The African Union Commission and the Arab League have also welcomed the initiative, lending it an important degree of regional support. Their backing adds weight to efforts to revive a Sudanese-led political dialogue, though outside support cannot substitute for the trust of Sudanese political forces.

The committee’s initiative should therefore be assessed without either excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal measures announced after the committee’s engagement with al-Burhan are an encouraging first step, but the real test lies ahead. Will it help remove the legal and political barriers opposition actors face in practice, not just on paper? Can it win the trust of those who have rejected it? Can it ensure that Sudanese of all political and geographic backgrounds have the opportunity to participate freely?

What is clear is that Sudan’s crisis will ultimately require Sudanese actors with deeply divergent visions for the country’s future to sit down together and engage politically with one another. No committee can do that for them. No outside actor can do it for them. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions for such engagement to become possible. The concerns raised by critics should not be dismissed, but they should also not be grounds for rejecting the initiative before it has a chance to address them. Those who have rejected it should be willing to reconsider their position if the committee proves it can build an independent and inclusive process. If it succeeds, the committee will have made a vital contribution to the country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.