Somalia's Political Crisis: Risk of Collapse as Electoral Roadmap Remains Elusive

Somalia is entering one of the most perilous phases of its modern history without an agreed electoral roadmap or political transition. U.S.- and British-mediated talks between the government and opposition collapsed on May 15 — the day President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s four-year term expired — placing severe strain on the legitimacy of federal institutions.

Justin Davis, U.S. chargé d'affaires in Somalia, and British Ambassador Charles King attempted to broker a political transition deal between the two sides. Their failure left the country without a unified direction at the worst possible time.

Since 2008, Somalia has consistently ranked among the world’s most fragile states. Under President Mohamud, the nation now confronts a political deadlock that threatens its survival. The crisis unfolds amid widespread insecurity, a humanitarian disaster, economic stagnation, entrenched corruption, and rising geopolitical competition.

At the heart of the crisis is the contentious nature of the Somali polity. Somaliland demands independence, while Puntland and Jubbaland have severed ties with the federal government. Al-Shabab controls vast territories and key transport routes. The federal government and at least three federal member states are operating beyond their mandates. The electoral calendar has expired without a vote: the four-year parliamentary term ended in April 2026, and the presidential term expired a month later, but no electoral or transition roadmap has been agreed upon to replace them.

In a controversial process, the government unilaterally amended the constitution, passed an electoral law that the opposition calls self-serving, and established an electoral commission that critics view as biased. Over the past four years, executive, legislative, and judicial powers have become increasingly concentrated in President Mohamud's hands.

The national opposition, alongside Puntland and Jubbaland, has denounced these actions as a power grab and rejected them. They argue that the 2012 constitution, reflecting Somalia's political agreement, remains the governing law. The country is now caught between competing claims of constitutionality. The government maintains it is advancing long-held democratic ambitions for Somalia, shifting from indirect clan-based elections to direct universal suffrage, and that the constitutional amendment extending the presidential term from four to five years was legally passed by parliament.

Universal suffrage and party politics remain distant dreams for most Somalis. Both the government and the opposition accept a clan-based power-sharing system. However, they disagree on how to select clan representatives at the state and federal levels. The government wants a one-year term extension and proposes a clan-representative electoral system that critics say would entrench itself in power. The opposition favors an improved indirect electoral process for clans to select representatives.

The political crisis strikes a nation already grappling with severe security and governance challenges. While Mogadishu’s security has improved, widespread violence continues, particularly in south-central Somalia. According to the ACLED database, nationwide fatalities in 2025 hit a record high, and al-Shabab has been responsible for the vast majority of conflict-related deaths over the past two decades. Under the current administration, data shows tens of thousands of deaths nationwide, concentrated in Banadir, Lower Shabelle, Lower Jubba, and Hiran regions.

The crisis unfolds against a worsening humanitarian and economic backdrop. Although rains have arrived, humanitarian organizations warn that millions of Somalis face food insecurity. International aid efforts struggle with funding shortfalls. Foreign assistance has declined since the Trump administration dissolved USAID in 2025, while Somalia’s budget revenue-to-GDP ratio remains in the low single digits. Concerns about state viability are pushing many toward a resource-based economy, particularly as Turkey expands its involvement in Somalia’s oil and fisheries sectors.

Corruption erodes trust in state institutions. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia has consistently ranked among the world’s most corrupt nations for the past decade. Corruption undermines nearly every facet of governance. The government’s land management approach deepens concerns, with allegations of forced evictions of those occupying public land seized during the war and sales to merchants without due process. Many citizens with legal documents from previous administrations have also lost their homes.

Domestic pressures are amplified by regional and global competition. Somalia struggles to navigate intensifying rivalry in the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the western Indian Ocean. The political elite remains fractured, responding not as a unified state but through clans, factions, and regions. Different groups align with various regional powers and neighboring countries.

Regional players such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Iran, and Egypt are increasingly active in the Horn of Africa. Israel became the first country to officially recognize Somaliland late last year, heightening competition among regional powers.

The converging political, security, economic, and humanitarian pressures severely impact civic space. The government is accused of silencing dissent by imprisoning journalists and activists. The opposition calls for protests, while the government publicly discourages public participation.

Somalia stands at a critical juncture. Timely international intervention could help steer the country away from violence and political fragmentation. In the past, traditional donors such as the U.S., EU, and the UK have helped facilitate five political transitions in 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2022.

U.S. and British diplomats in Mogadishu have made important efforts to bring the parties together and facilitate dialogue, albeit late. A final push may require more direct engagement from Washington and London, as well as Gulf donors. Turkey has expressed interest in contributing to reconciliation efforts, with Ankara holding influence over politicians in both the government and opposition.

The international community should first pressure the government to negotiate a good-faith political roadmap focused on a viable and timely electoral process. Villa Somalia (the presidency) should stop using state institutions — including security forces, aviation agencies, and international aid — as tools in political disputes.

At the same time, the opposition should be encouraged to engage constructively with the government and avoid initiating parallel processes that could lead to an alternative administration. Crucially, the international community should impose targeted sanctions on political spoilers who use extrajudicial measures to destabilize the country.

Beyond the immediate political deadlock, there is an urgent need for genuine national dialogue and reconciliation. Previous peace processes in Djibouti and Kenya involved broader participation of stakeholders in peacebuilding and helped establish the Third Republic. A lesson from those processes is that institutions built by people not fully reconciled cannot last. Somalis have never had the opportunity for a serious and comprehensive national dialogue. They need an open forum, true reconciliation, and state institutions they collectively own.

Somalia is on the brink of political disintegration, but it is still in the prevention phase. That is why the broader international community must act now, as it has done in the past. There is still time to lead Somalia away from a self-destructive path and preserve decades of state-building and peace investments.