Southeast Asia's Haze: As Polluters Go Unpunished, Every Dry Season Brings the Same Crisis

The haze has returned to Southeast Asia with familiar and severe intensity. Malaysia has had to close schools as air quality deteriorates, Singapore has recorded air pollution at dangerous levels, and even parts of the Philippines have been affected — showing how far the smoke has spread. In Indonesia, forest and peatland fires, the main source of the regional haze, continue to threaten communities and livelihoods, particularly in parts of Kalimantan. What begins as land burning in one country can become a public health emergency across the region.

The immediate response follows a familiar script: put out the fires, hand out masks and seek regional cooperation. All of it is necessary, but none of it explains why the emergency keeps recurring. Malaysian students miss school, Singaporeans breathe polluted air, Philippine communities are exposed to smoke drifting across borders and Indonesian families living near fire zones all bear different losses from the same regional failure.

Dry weather and El Nino can make fires spread more fiercely, but many blazes are deliberately set to clear farmland. The deeper question is why activities that cause enormous public loss remain attractive to those who benefit. When the gains from cheap land preparation are concentrated in a few hands while the costs of haze are spread across communities and across national borders, market signals are distorted and political responsibility becomes easier to dodge.

The haze is therefore not merely an environmental emergency or a test of diplomatic goodwill. It disrupts daily life, strains public services and exposes how easily environmental costs can be pushed onto others. It is a failure of the economic accountability mechanism. Until Southeast Asia changes who pays for the damage, how land-clearing decisions are monitored and what happens after proven violations, every dry season will bring another round of emergency measures and the same familiar arguments over who is to blame.

The economics of cheap land burning

Fire is a cheap way to clear vegetation, especially where land governance is weak, alternatives are costly and law enforcement is uncertain. The private calculation is simple: spend little on land preparation and reap the profit. Meanwhile, fires cause respiratory illness, lost workdays, school closures and transport disruption, while destroying ecosystems and releasing greenhouse gases. These costs are rarely borne in full by those who start the fires.

The World Bank's assessment of Indonesia's 2015 fire crisis estimated damage of at least $16.1 billion, equivalent to 1.9% of GDP that year. Government figures recorded 2.6 million hectares burned between June and October. The World Bank linked the fires to cheap land preparation, drought and weak enforcement. The estimate covered agriculture, trade, tourism, transport, health and emergency response, but excluded some long-term health losses and lost ecosystem services.

That figure is not a bill for the 2026 fires. It shows the scale of damage a recurring crisis can cause. Recent estimates put the area burned in Indonesia this year at between 637,000 and 900,000 hectares, while Health Ministry data recorded 283,270 respiratory cases linked to the fires across seven provinces as of October 13. In West Kalimantan province, fires are also threatening communities and livelihoods, showing that Indonesians living beside the flames bear losses long before the smoke reaches neighbouring countries.

This is the core economic distortion: the cost of burning is not fully reflected in the decision to burn. When benefits accrue privately while the costs of health, lost income and ecological damage are borne by society, fire can remain economically attractive despite an enormous total cost. Smallholders need viable, affordable alternatives; companies must face credible legal liability when evidence links them to fires; and peatland needs restoration and sustainable water management rather than attention only when the smoke becomes a political problem.

ASEAN's accountability gap

Haze crosses borders, but responsibility and enforcement remain largely national. Tracing pollution to a specific fire, identifying who is responsible and proving transboundary damage is not easy. A satellite hotspot is a warning signal, but it is not in itself proof of who lit the fire or which company should be held liable.

ASEAN is not short of rules. The Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2003; Indonesia ratified it in 2014. The region also has a Haze-Free Roadmap and a sustainable peatland management strategy for 2023-2030. But agreements cannot substitute for consistent implementation, transparent enforcement or incentives that make prevention economically rational.

The challenge lies in turning commitments into effective action. Cooperation can improve monitoring and preparedness, but ASEAN's consensus-based diplomacy offers little leverage when national enforcement is inconsistent or commercial interests work against scrutiny. The ASEAN Investment Framework for Haze-Free Sustainable Land Management aims to mobilise $1.5 billion by 2030. Yet money is not enough without transparent spending, measurable results and accountability for recurring fires.

This does not mean every fire is caused by large corporations, or that all pollution in Kuala Lumpur or Singapore originates in Indonesia. Local emissions and weather conditions also play a role, and fires can involve companies, smallholders or other actors. Accountability requires investigations that identify those responsible and distinguish proven violations from suspicion. Blanket blame lets violators disappear into disputes over sovereignty, while a lack of transparent evidence erodes trust between neighbours.

Making polluters pay

ASEAN foreign ministers are expected to discuss the haze crisis at preparatory meetings ahead of the bloc's summit in Manila in November. The talks should be judged on whether they move the region from responding to haze to preventing it.

First, member states should publish comparable data on burned area, fire frequency, concession areas and enforcement outcomes. Satellite findings should be checked against field investigations, and concession maps should be opened up so communities and independent researchers can monitor them. Greater transparency will make it harder to hide responsibility behind contradictory statements.

Second, governments need to put the polluter-pays principle into practice. When investigations establish responsibility, penalties and restoration orders must be proportionate to the damage caused, while repeat violations should carry stronger consequences. Environmental liability must rest on evidence and be applied consistently, not used as a political weapon. Penalties must also be heavy enough to deter, rather than becoming just a cost of doing business.

Third, prevention must be economically feasible. Smallholders need machinery, technical support, credit and market access so that alternatives to burning become affordable. Peatland rewetting, firebreaks and community-based monitoring need funding that can be predicted before the dry season, rather than discretionary budgets after fires spread. ASEAN's investment framework can help mobilise resources, but governments should disclose where the money goes and assess its impact on reducing fires and smoke exposure.

Finally, ASEAN should publish a regional scorecard tied to the goal of being haze-free by 2030. The scorecard should track not only hotspots and burned area but also repeat fires, response times, law enforcement, peatland restoration, the number of schools closed and people's exposure to dangerous air. No regional mechanism can replace Indonesia's responsibility to prevent fires on its territory. But sovereignty cannot mean ignoring the cost of domestic land-use decisions once smoke has crossed borders. The principle should be simple: those who benefit from risky activity must not be allowed to shift the bill to children kept out of school, workers who lose income, families who fall ill or neighbouring countries.

For more than two decades, ASEAN has had agreements, strategies and roadmaps. The return of the haze does not make those efforts meaningless; it shows that prevention is still insufficient. If leaders leave the November meeting with another statement but no transparent indicators, credible enforcement and funding for alternatives, the region will again treat the symptoms while maintaining the incentives that create them. Economic accountability is not an add-on to haze policy. It is the condition for that policy to work.