Iran Changes the Rules in Hormuz, the Gulf Changes Its Approach to Iran
Mark Pfeifle
Five months into the Gulf conflict, Iran holds leverage in the Strait of Hormuz, but Gulf states are forging new security alliances, including a defense pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan, to counter Tehran's influence. Negotiations to reopen Hormuz remain stalled over transit fees and control, while proxies and broader diplomatic shifts redefine regional stability.
More than five months after the conflict erupted, the military tempo in the Gulf has slowed. The central dispute now is who sets the rules of the game in the region.
On Friday, a US official said Iran and Oman could soon reach an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Washington declared it would lift its blockade on Iranian ports once commercial shipping resumes unhindered. Less than a day later, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rejected the account. A spokesman said reopening Hormuz depends on the US accepting Iran's conditions, not a deal with Oman.
Oman has narrowed the dispute to a shipping lane through Hormuz but has not resolved who controls the territorial waters. Washington wants commercial vessels to move through international waters without seeking Iran's permission or paying fees. Tehran wants a solution that preserves the advantage it gained from restricting passage. Negotiators have agreed on coordinates for the shipping lane through Hormuz, but Iran still seeks to control vessels entering and exiting and to impose transit fees—both of which Washington rejects.
The deal must also be viable for shipping companies. Ship owners need assurances that their vessels will not be attacked, detained, or trapped in territorial waters. Insurers must provide coverage. Iran's demand for transit fees creates another problem: Americans and US-owned or US-controlled companies cannot pay Iran for safe passage without violating US sanctions.
Some war-risk insurance contracts may also terminate coverage when ships pay certain Hormuz transit fees. If ships refuse to pay Tehran, they could be at risk. If they pay, owners could face issues with insurers or Washington.
Diplomats may reopen Hormuz on paper, but captains must reopen it at sea.
Iran cannot confront the US militarily, but it has learned how to shift the costs of conflict onto others. The restrictions at Hormuz affect an insurance contract in London, a liquefied natural gas deal in Qatar, an energy bill in Asia, and ultimately a political calculation in Washington.
The very war that allowed Iran to turn a shipping lane into a weapon is now pushing Saudi Arabia to seek security alliances alongside its defense agreements with Washington.
By the end of March, Saudi data showed Iran had launched over 700 missiles and drones at the kingdom. Saudi air defenses intercepted most, but Riyadh has spent months protecting cities, military installations, and energy infrastructure.
Iran can also strike Saudi Arabia through armed proxy forces. From Yemen, the Houthis have resumed missile, drone, and ground attacks, this week wounding 11 civilians in the Najran region. To the north, Iran-backed Iraqi militias threaten retaliation while Baghdad tries to keep its territory from becoming another launchpad against neighbors.
On Friday, Riyadh signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan. An armed attack on any of the three countries would be considered an attack on all. The deal links Saudi Arabia with NATO's second-largest army and a nuclear-armed Pakistan with long-standing military ties to the kingdom.
A regional official familiar with security discussions said Iran is likely to test the agreement through a proxy force. The Houthis give Tehran deniability from Yemen. Some Iran-backed Iraqi militias could offer a different direction. Both could allow Iran to explore how far it can go while forcing Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad to decide when an attack on one country becomes a war for all three.
The agreement does not specify what each country must do after an attack, and both Pakistan and Turkiye maintain their own separate relations with Iran. Tehran has spent five months choosing where and how to expand the conflict. Riyadh has now made that choice more complicated.
The agreement also raises questions about how much protection Washington can provide in a prolonged war. Gulf governments have watched the US expend vast amounts of air defense and missile-defense assets while Iran targeted military bases, energy facilities, and cities. Riyadh is not distancing itself from Washington; it is ensuring Washington is no longer its only option.
Egypt has moved closer to this new grouping. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt have held months of meetings as a four-nation group. In June, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted the foreign ministers of the other three countries in Cairo and called on them to make these meetings a permanent part of regional security cooperation. If Cairo joins the Mecca agreement, three becomes four, and the accord gains far heavier weight across the region.
Doha has close ties with Turkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Iran has attacked Qatar and disrupted its energy exports through Hormuz. But Qatar has built much of its influence by talking to governments that do not talk to each other. Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani remains engaged with US President Donald Trump in efforts to de-escalate the Iran conflict even as Qatar pays a heavy price for it. Joining the agreement could offer Qatar stronger security guarantees, but it would also make that diplomatic role harder.
In Doha, restaurants are crowded again. Traffic flows smoothly through the city. Rooftop dinners overlooking the Gulf are no longer interrupted by missile warnings.
The next peace in the Gulf will not look like the one before this war. It will depend on who sets the rules at Hormuz, who answers for the next proxy attack, and who can still keep Tehran and Washington talking before another missile crosses the horizon.