Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan Defense Pact: A New Shield or Strategic Signal?

Islamabad, Pakistan – Three documents – two green and one deep red – were exchanged beneath a portrait of Saudi King Salman at al-Safa Palace in Mecca on Friday. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif held them up for the cameras, the ink on the pages still fresh.

The signatures of the three leaders bound Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan into the “Makkah Joint Defense Agreement,” which treats an attack on any of the three as an attack on all. The joint defense pact, which names no specific threat, was signed more than five months after the US-Israel war on Iran began – a conflict that has seen missiles and drones strike Gulf oil exporters, including Saudi Arabia, and closed much of the Strait of Hormuz.

The agreement builds on a bilateral Saudi-Pakistan treaty signed less than a year earlier, now expanded to include Turkey’s NATO-standard defense industry and military. Prime Minister Sharif called it a “shield of peace” for the region, while President Erdogan said the pact is “not directed at any country” and is “open to participation by all brotherly countries seeking peace, prosperity, and stability.” Saudi officials also stressed the agreement poses no threat to regional security and does not come at the expense of the kingdom’s relations with other allies, including the United States and Gulf states.

However, the signing raised questions about a shift in the regional balance of power. Muhammad Faisal, a security and foreign policy analyst, said the agreement’s value “lies in creating uncertainty for adversaries and enhancing collective deterrence, rather than in defining fixed military obligations like Western alliances.” Kamran Bokhari, a senior fellow at the Middle East Policy Council in Washington, agreed that the practical changes at this stage are minimal, calling it a “strategic signal” rather than a “combat alliance,” with any integrated military capabilities still years away.

The trilateral relationship is not new. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have run a formal defense industry forum since at least 2022, laying groundwork before the bilateral agreement last year and the escalation of regional tensions due to the war with Iran. Sardar Masood Khan, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington and Beijing, said the Saudi-Pakistan treaty “was and remains the nucleus,” noting interest from countries like Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Kuwait emerged right after the signing in September 2025. “Turkey was the first to decide. This network could expand in the future,” he said.

Dania Thafer, executive director of the Gulf International Forum, said Kuwait and Qatar are the most likely candidates, based on emerging defense ties between Kuwait and Pakistan and long-standing Qatari-Turkish relations. “There are real opportunities, especially with Qatar and Kuwait, to expand this pact, and there is a shared interest in moving in that direction. This is a space to watch closely,” she said.

That interest did not arise in a vacuum. Since October 2023, Israel has struck at least six countries in the region, including a September 2025 airstrike on a Hamas leader in Doha – the first known Israeli attack inside a Gulf state. Last month, Kuwait ratified a defense pact with Pakistan signed in 2023. The Arabic text published in the official gazette lists 11 areas of cooperation, including training, logistics, and intelligence sharing – with no provision resembling a collective defense obligation. Article 9 of the pact states it does not affect the parties’ obligations under other international agreements, insulating it from other commitments.

Analyst Faisal argued the Mecca pact should be understood similarly at this point, while Bokhari said the failure to name a specific threat is intentional, not accidental. “All parties understand that the agreement is primarily aimed at deterring Iran and the network of non-state forces Tehran has built across the region, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shia militias,” Bokhari said, adding that all three signatories are “not ready for an open strategic confrontation with Tehran.”

The signing came as Yemen’s Houthi rebels resumed attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and oil tankers in the Red Sea, threatening a naval blockade. Saudi Arabia, which backs Yemen’s internationally recognized government, responded with airstrikes on Houthi-held areas. Aziz Alghasian, a Saudi researcher and non-resident senior fellow at the Gulf International Forum, said the Houthi threat is not the direct cause of the pact but a catalyst. Calling it “deterrence centered on Saudi,” he said the kingdom has sought to develop its capabilities alongside building alliances to deter attacks, rather than relying solely on US security guarantees.

Analysts say each side brings its own strengths to the alliance. Alghasian pointed to Saudi funding, Pakistan’s nuclear status and manpower, and Turkey’s fast-growing defense export industry. Pakistan’s nuclear power status has long been seen as a unique contribution to any Gulf pact, but Alghasian said that from a Saudi perspective, viewing Islamabad as the most valuable signatory is somewhat overstated. “Turkey is a key partner for developing Saudi Arabia’s defense industry capabilities, and I think that angle interests Saudi much more than the Pakistan aspect,” he added.

Gokhan Ereli, an international relations expert and assistant professor at Ibn Haldun University, said what Turkey gains from the pact is “strategic depth” and “formal influence over the Gulf and South Asia that no European alliance has ever granted.” “Ankara is not swapping NATO for Mecca. Turkey is investing in a second insurance policy in a region where the first one has stopped paying out reliably,” Ereli said.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s maneuvering space is partly shaped by its dependence on financial aid. Days before the summit, the State Bank of Pakistan confirmed Saudi Arabia had extended over $5 billion in deposits for another three years, part of $8 billion currently supporting Pakistan’s balance of payments.

The pact also followed a separate Saudi-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal last month to establish a nuclear program in the kingdom, which has long expressed interest in civilian nuclear technology to diversify away from fossil fuels. Rayed Krimly, Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister for Public Diplomacy, said on social media that the Mecca deal “has nothing to do with nuclear ambitions or an arms race.” Analyst Faisal said such statements reflect practical constraints, not just diplomatic caution. “Turkey does not need Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella because it is a NATO member with US nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, while Saudi Arabia is pursuing civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. Pakistan’s nuclear status matters only as implicit strategic weight,” he said.

That ambiguity also raises questions for Islamabad. Pakistan has spent months mediating between the US and Iran – and Bokhari believes that role could be affected after signing the pact. “Its mediating credentials will certainly be diminished, but not eliminated,” he said. Faisal was less pessimistic, noting Pakistan’s mediating role is “also a collective effort” with Qatar. Alghasian, the Saudi analyst, argued Pakistan’s presence is a deliberate choice to reduce criticism. “When you have a mediator in a trilateral defense deal, it is hard to credibly describe it as anti-Iran. I think bringing Pakistan to the table was a wise and deliberate decision. It provides diplomatic insulation for this pact,” he said.

Conversely, Thafer said the deterrence logic works precisely because Pakistan and Turkey share borders with Iran, making “the risk rise significantly if Iran considers any direct action against Saudi Arabia.” Ereli said Turkey has more incentive than its partners to keep Tehran engaged rather than fearful. “Ankara’s task, as always, is to deter without provoking – and that is a balance Turkey has more incentive than anyone in this bloc to maintain,” he said.

Tehran’s first public reaction came from parliament. Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, wrote on social media that “a paper agreement” with Turkey and Pakistan will not bring security to Saudi Arabia, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security.” Alghasian said Iran’s “dismissive” tone is “predictable... that kind of attitude is what we have come to expect.” Reza Khanzadeh, a Middle East analyst at George Mason University, said the parliamentary-level reaction may not last, and Iran will likely pursue both diplomacy and deterrence. “Tehran will probably not see this as just three bilateral relationships formalized at the same time,” he warned, noting the collective defense clause changes how the separate relationships operate. Khanzadeh predicted Pakistan will be Iran’s first diplomatic priority due to the shared border and Islamabad’s mediating role; Tehran will likely seek assurances about troop deployments and any nuclear implications for Saudi security. He also pointed to uncertainty within Iran’s leadership. “Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not appeared publicly, raising questions about who is the real final decision-maker in the regime, which leaves room for even the smallest groups to express opposition and concern over this pact,” he argued.