ISWAP and Boko Haram Rebuild Strength in Lake Chad Region

Abuja, Nigeria – The U.S.-Nigerian operation that killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, deputy leader of the Islamic State (ISIS), was hailed as a significant counterterrorism success. But analysts tracking the Lake Chad basin say the event underscores a persistent and complex security crisis.

Al-Minuki, a Nigerian from Borno state, operated from a compound near Lake Chad – the heart of one of the world’s most active militant zones.

His choice of northeastern Nigeria as a base highlights the conditions fueling a new wave of violence by both factions: ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) and its rival JAS (Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da'wa wa al-Jihad), commonly known as Boko Haram.

Equally notable is the parallel resurgence of Boko Haram, which has quietly rebuilt while security forces focused on the more powerful ISWAP.

“While regional forces concentrated on countering threats from ISWAP – partly due to the group’s advanced drone capabilities – Boko Haram appears to have exploited the lack of attention to its rival to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a Sahel security expert, told Al Jazeera. “This seems to have allowed both sides to rebuild strength and launch fresh attacks in the region.”

Borders, Weak Governance and Rising Violence

Beyond the immediate tactics of Boko Haram and ISWAP, the rise in violence around Lake Chad also highlights broader regional challenges in coordination and intelligence-sharing among affected countries.

“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a border, the vast Sahel between them has many porous frontiers that allow jihadists and their weapons to move. The situation in Mali has turned the Sahel into a more permissive environment for armed groups, increasing risks to Nigeria through spillover effects,” said Kabir Amadu, managing director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger to harmonise military operations are often hampered by logistical bottlenecks, differing command structures and uneven resource allocation, creating opportunities for militant groups to exploit border gaps.

Local communities face a dual pressure of insecurity and humanitarian hardship, often relying on informal networks for protection and survival – inadvertently providing safe havens or corridors for fighters. Humanitarian organisations report that civilians are increasingly trapped in cycles of displacement and forced recruitment.

In some areas, fear, mistrust and weakened traditional power structures make communities vulnerable to coercion or influence by armed groups. Economic factors also appear to play a significant role in the resurgence of both groups. Control of islands in Lake Chad can provide power over taxation routes, smuggling corridors and resource extraction.

The Mechanics of Violence

This blend of militant activity and criminal enterprise seems to help the groups sustain strength. Boko Haram mixes ideological activity with criminality, including robbery and kidnapping, to raise funds and attract frustrated youth. Recruitment is driven by fragile socio-economic conditions – poverty and high unemployment – rather than ideology alone.

The shortcoming of reintegration programmes also contributes to the problem, as former fighters rejoin Boko Haram after facing limited life prospects. Research from the ISS indicates that former ISWAP members who would be executed if they defected have joined Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, known for its ransom and robbery operations.

Beyond financial and operational factors, the groups exploit gaps in local governance and security presence to consolidate influence. Remote communities often experience inconsistent law enforcement, limited state services and weak administrative oversight.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram have revived in the Lake Chad basin for three main reasons: their resilience and adaptability to Nigerian military tactics; a lucrative war economy that sustains funding and manpower; and the limited capacity of the Nigerian state to establish a lasting, legitimate presence in the region,” said Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, speaking to Al Jazeera.

Beyond the Military Dimension

Many drivers of armed attacks in the Lake Chad basin cannot be resolved by military operations alone. The conditions that provide ISWAP and Boko Haram with recruitment bases, logistical support and social legitimacy in some communities stem from decades of poverty, displacement, governance gaps and political exclusion.

Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows the region has 2.9 million internally displaced people, 2.3 million of them in Nigeria. Violence has forced 1,827 schools to close across the Lake Chad basin, while humanitarian operations have received only 19% of the funding needed for 2025.

“The recent resurgence of ISWAP and Boko Haram reflects not just a military failure but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad basin,” said Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant.

The Lake Chad basin continues to face overlapping crises: millions displaced, schools shut and insufficient humanitarian aid. Armed groups exploit geographic and administrative gaps to expand operations, while regional security cooperation struggles to keep pace with their adaptability.

“Although the killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt the command structure, it could also trigger retaliatory violence as rival jihadist factions compete for relevance, legitimacy and territorial influence,” Sadiq said.

In the weeks after the strike, intelligence reports noted an uptick in small-scale attacks and cross-border raids, suggesting operational fragmentation has not reduced the groups’ ability to coordinate assaults. Civilians continue to face movement restrictions and increased risks of recruitment, extortion and displacement.

“With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are likely to step up their activities, potentially expanding attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad basin and northeastern Nigeria,” Sadiq concluded.