Trump-Xi meeting and the prospect of a US-China 'G2'

US President Donald Trump is expected to arrive in Beijing on Wednesday for a two-day summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders since they reached a ceasefire in the trade war six months ago.

The meeting, which was postponed from March because of the US-Israel war in Iran, comes as Trump needs a foreign-policy win amid domestic discontent over the Middle East conflict.

US-China relations have also been strained by the war, which has damaged China's economy. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington's blockade of Iranian ports have left Chinese ships stranded and severely affected crude-oil imports, half of which are shipped from the Middle East.

Trump is expected to demand that China join an “international campaign” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, something Beijing has refused. In return, Xi wants progress on trade, rare-earth minerals, and recognition of China’s claim to Taiwan.

What is the G2 concept?

The idea of a “G2” between the US and China, akin to the G7 or G20, was proposed by American economist C Fred Bergsten in 2005. Originally, it advocated for the two largest economies to share responsibility for stabilising global markets and tackling common problems, rather than imposing hegemony.

The concept gained traction under President Barack Obama, who established the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) with Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2009 in pursuit of a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive” relationship.

Can a US-China G2 be formed?

For years, the idea of the US and China jointly managing the world has met with deep scepticism. The G2 now raises fears of a shift away from multilateralism toward two superpowers imposing their interests on other nations.

Jing Gu, director of the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development at the Institute of Development Studies in the UK, said the meeting should not be seen as the start of a G2 but as “strategic reconnaissance”, where “both sides read each other’s ultimate limits, clarify red lines and test the pressure before tensions stabilise into a breakdown”. The aim, she said, is not necessarily to end competition but to manage its pace and avoid a collision.

Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute in the UK, predicted a successful trade deal was possible but that did not mean a G2 would take shape. “The fundamental tension is that Trump wants to reassert that the US is the strongest, and Xi wants the same,” he said.

Current state of US-China relations

When the two leaders met in South Korea on October 30 and agreed to lift trade restrictions, both sides hailed the outcome as positive. Trump gave it a “12 out of 10” rating and called it a “G2” meeting, though no comprehensive deal was signed. Later, Xi described China’s ambitions as not conflicting with Trump’s “Make America Great Again” goal.

However, John Minnich, a lecturer in US-China relations at the London School of Economics, noted the core obstacle is that “China is getting stronger relative to the US”. He argued that the US finds it hard to accept China as its peer, let alone equal, in technology, economics and military power, making substantial cooperation difficult to sustain.

Zhiqun Zhu, director of the China Institute at Bucknell University in the US, said Trump has “veered away from a confrontational approach” with China but “is not interested in institutionalising a moderate approach”. On the Chinese side, Zhu said Beijing “does not want to form a G2 with the US”, as it consistently stresses the role of the United Nations and supports a multipolar order.

Reaction from the rest of the world

Gu said a G2 would mean the world accepting US-China co-management, something many countries — including Europe, India, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, the Middle East and ASEAN — “do not want a global order negotiated over their heads”.

Tsang warned that if a G2 emerged, the world would be dominated by two powers focused only on their own interests, making institutions such as the WTO “even more irrelevant”. Europe is especially worried about being excluded from major decisions. The EU in February made extensive commitments to reduce dependence on US LNG and Chinese rare earths.

India, Brazil and other emerging economies in BRICS also see closer US-China ties as a challenge to their superpower ambitions. Recently, New Delhi and Brasilia strengthened their strategic alliance, agreeing to double bilateral trade to $30 billion by 2030.

Minnich argued that any deal involving Chinese investment in the US would divert capital and technology from countries in the Global South. “US-China collusion is also bad news for Europe,” he said.

Gu concluded: “Countries in the Global South do not want the world to be divided into spheres of influence or dominated by a bilateral arrangement. They want choice, finance, technology, markets and policy space. They do not want to be reduced to the competitive terrain of great powers.”