US-Israel War with Iran: Things That Cannot Change in the Middle East

In every major Middle East war, a recurring illusion returns: the belief that bombs can rewrite history. The US-Israel war against Iran is swiftly and powerfully redrawing the Middle East's map in unprecedented ways. Yet there are enduring realities that war and bombs, however precise, cannot erase or change.

Experts and analysts constantly predict what the region will look like when hostilities end. Some argue this conflict will reshape the Middle East, toppling regional axes and creating a new order. That is partly true; historically, major wars leave deep fractures and transform maps, systems, and demographics. But there is also a methodological delusion accompanying every war: the belief that it can wipe the slate clean and create a blank page for a fresh start—even as history consistently refutes such illusions.

Throughout its long history of civilizations and peoples, the Middle East has shown a remarkable capacity to absorb major shocks and restructure. The region has witnessed Islamic conquests, Mongol invasions, the Crusades, European colonialism, the Cold War, waves of extremism, and civil wars. Yet the Middle East resists change unless it unfolds organically and gradually.

Now, as signs indicate the US-Israel war with Iran is nearing its end, the most overlooked question seems to be: What will not change?

Strategic geography will survive the war

Since human civilization first took root in this region, geography has dictated its destiny. The Strait of Hormuz still controls the flow of nearly one-fifth of the world's oil. The Suez Canal remains one of international trade's most vital arteries. The Fertile Crescent still connects Asia to Europe. This geography is destiny, not a choice, and no military force can alter it.

Iran will remain a nation overlooking the Strait of Hormuz even after the war ends. Yemen will continue to be the southern gateway of Bab al-Mandeb, one of the world's most important waterways. Egypt will retain control of the Suez Canal. In some cases, war may change who governs these sites, but not their geographic significance. As long as this geography exists, the struggle for control will persist.

The Palestine issue will not be marginalized

Perhaps the greatest illusion exposed by the war with Iran is the belief that destroying the 'axis of resistance' will remove the Palestine issue from the regional agenda. This is a structural delusion that confuses instrument with essence. Iran invested in the Palestine issue and leveraged it ideologically and strategically, but Tehran neither created the problem nor holds the key to ending it.

The Palestine issue existed before the Islamic Republic of Iran was born and will persist regardless of whether the Iranian regime succeeds, survives, or fails. The suffering of nearly eight million Palestinians living under occupation will not change with the destruction of Iran's nuclear program or the assassination of its supreme leader.

The 2020 Abraham Accords were built on a central assumption: Iran represents a shared existential threat uniting Israel and the Arab Gulf states in a strategic bloc, and this security alignment would be enough to overcome and sideline the Palestine issue. However, the outbreak of war with Iran has exposed the fragility and limitations of that equation.

For its part, Iran has succeeded in portraying itself as a victim of US-Israel aggression, reclaiming some Arab public sympathy it lost due to interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. This complicates the narrative that Iran is the Arab world's primary enemy.

At the same time, Arab public opinion from the Atlantic to the Gulf—including among younger generations in countries maintaining formal peace with Israel—remains deeply attached to the Palestine issue in ways that transcend official government calculations. Therefore, any regional order that fails to address the Palestine issue will carry within it the seeds of instability.

Sectarian divisions will persist

The US-Israel war with Iran has deepened sectarian tensions in several regional countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. But these tensions did not start with the Iranian Revolution, nor will they end with Iran's defeat.

The war may weaken Iran's ability to exploit these divisions and may shift the power balance among sectarian groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, but it will not erase sectarian identity. Shia communities in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia have their own grievances and social realities independent of Tehran, and they will continue shaping their countries' political landscape regardless of the Islamic Republic's fate.

The fragility of Arab states will remain

What the war will not change—and did not create in the first place—is the structural crisis of the modern Arab state. States weakened by weak political institutions, weak judicial systems, bloated security apparatuses that consume resources needed for development and welfare, and inefficient subsidy-dependent economies were fragile before the war and will remain fragile after it.

In fact, there is a risk the war could deepen this fragility—distracting Arab governments with security confrontations and temporary alliances while delaying political and economic reforms that directly affect their citizens. Countries that invest in confrontation with Iran rather than in education and competitive economies may face an enormous domestic bill when hostilities end.

Those who shelter under the US will remain exposed

Even before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, faith in the US model in the region had begun to erode. Arab publics, even in states allied with Washington, view US policy with anger and sometimes contempt.

The war with Iran may partially restore US credibility in the eyes of governments that once feared Iranian dominance, but it will not restore broad Arab public trust in the US vision for the Middle East.

Military power alone is no longer enough to build legitimacy or trust. The US learned this in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it may have to relearn it in Iran.

Islamic politics will survive beyond Iran's axis

The war has dealt a heavy blow to the political Islamist current aligned with Iran and contributed to the fragmentation of the 'axis of resistance's ideological structure. However, Islamist political movements in the region are far more diverse and complex than just Iran.

The Muslim Brotherhood, activist Salafi movements, and other nationalist Islamist currents all emerge from local social contexts and political grievances unrelated to Tehran.

What the war will not change is the reality that Islam, for millions in the region, remains a source of identity and a framework for understanding justice, politics, and resistance. This reference point will not vanish with the destruction of the Fordow nuclear facility near Qom. Any vacuum created by the collapse of one axis will most likely be filled by competition among alternative Islamic references, not by the emergence of a liberal secular age.

If there is one historical lesson this region teaches us, it is this: Major wars can change governments, appearances, and power balances, but they rarely touch the foundational essence beneath.