How the Trump-Iran Memorandum Differs from the Obama-era Nuclear Deal

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) to end the US-Iran war was electronically signed near Paris, following weeks of US President Donald Trump repeatedly claiming a deal was imminent.

The 14-point framework signed on Wednesday stipulates that Iran commits not to buy or develop nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief, a $300 billion reconstruction plan, and the restoration of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in France on Wednesday, Trump hailed the Iran deal as superior to the 2015 accord brokered by former President Barack Obama, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which he withdrew from in 2018 during his first term.

However, analysts caution that it is too early to determine whether the MOU, which triggers a 60-day negotiation phase, will yield a comprehensive deal that differs significantly from the 18-page Obama-era document.

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, associate fellow at Chatham House in the UK, told Al Jazeera that it would not be “fair” to compare the two agreements at this stage, as the MOU focuses on extending a ceasefire rather than detailing Iran's nuclear program.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, director of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia, said the MOU “does not address any substantive issues” and “merely leaves all questions related to Iran’s nuclear program and uranium enrichment for the US and Iran to negotiate.”

Limiting Iran’s nuclear and weapons program

The agreement pushes discussions on Iran's nuclear program into the 60-day negotiation phase but explicitly states that Tehran “will not buy or develop nuclear weapons.” Both sides also commit to “address the disposal of enriched material stockpiled under a mechanism to be agreed by the two sides.”

The JCPOA included the same commitment by Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. It allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67% for 15 years—enough for a civilian nuclear energy program but far below the 90% needed for a weapon. The MOU does not specify whether or for how long Iran may enrich uranium.

Until Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, independent inspectors confirmed that Iran was complying with the agreed limits. Akbarzadeh noted that Iran’s commitment in the MOU not to develop nuclear weapons “is not a new point, or a new commitment,” as Iran has always maintained it does not seek an atomic bomb.

While the JCPOA was an international agreement involving China, Russia, the UK, and Germany “with detailed measures to limit uranium enrichment and a strict monitoring regime to ensure Iran’s compliance,” the MOU is a fragile bilateral deal between parties with low trust. The JCPOA had detailed snapback sanctions provisions for non-compliance, while the MOU lacks such specifics.

The JCPOA did not limit Iran’s conventional military, including ballistic missiles—something the US demanded before the war began. Frederic Schneider, non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, observed that Iran’s pledge not to develop nuclear weapons is not a significant gain for the US.

Schneider told Al Jazeera: “A Trump deal that achieves this would simply be maintaining the status quo,” adding that intelligence agencies, including the CIA, had concluded before the 12-day US-Iran war in June 2025 that Tehran was not actively developing nuclear weapons.

Sanctions relief and investment

The MOU states that the US commits to “ending all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran” and, together with regional partners, developing “a definitive, mutually agreed plan of at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development” of Iran.

Whereas the JCPOA implemented gradual sanctions relief contingent on Iran’s compliance with nuclear restrictions, the MOU says relief will take effect “according to an agreed timetable as part of the final deal.”

The JCPOA did not include funding for economic development. The $300 billion investment pledged to rebuild Iran through regional partners is a large sum that could lift Tehran out of isolation.

The MOU also states that Washington commits to “fully unfreezing” Iran’s blocked assets. Trump previously criticized the JCPOA for allowing Iran access to some restricted funds and cited this as a key reason for withdrawal. However, he now calls those funds “Iran’s money.”

Schneider noted that this commitment is more symbolic than practical because “the US does not hold many of Iran's assets” and “most of these funds are trapped trade revenues, with the largest portion in China and Iraq.”

Strait of Hormuz

This was never a subject in the JCPOA, but it became a major lever for Iran in the current talks. Iran closed the strait at the start of the conflict, blocking about one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supply, causing oil prices to soar.

The MOU states that the US will begin lifting its naval blockade “immediately” after signing the 14-point document and “fully end the naval blockade within 30 days.” Iran “will enter into dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to determine future management and maritime services at the Strait of Hormuz.”

Ali Alavi, lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian studies at SOAS University of London, said Iran has established a “new order” in the Middle East by asserting control over the waterway: “Iran has more leverage than during the JCPOA era” and “Trump has conceded more than the JCPOA gave Iran.”

Iran’s proxy forces and the Lebanon war

Neither the MOU nor the JCPOA explicitly mention Iran-backed armed groups. However, the MOU declares an “immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon,” without mentioning Israel or Hezbollah.

According to Bassiri Tabrizi, what makes a Trump deal better than the JCPOA is if it “does not push Iran toward continued deterrence through its nuclear program and through proxy forces.” He added: “What is needed is an agreement that economically engages Iran to such an extent that it gradually moves Iran away from a sense of vulnerability and builds mutual trust.” The next 60 days will determine whether that is feasible.