Taliban-Russia Memorandum: What Benefits for Afghanistan?
Shahmahmood Miakhel
A security cooperation memorandum signed on May 27 between the Taliban and Russia raises questions about Afghanistan's long-term national interests, as the country risks being drawn into regional geopolitical rivalries. The deal's tangible benefits may be limited while increasing risks of entanglement in great-power conflicts.
A security cooperation memorandum (MoU) signed on May 27 between the Taliban and Russia is sparking debate, though its contents remain undisclosed. The agreement raises important questions about its impact on Afghanistan's security, foreign policy, and international standing.
Legally, agreements made by a government lacking domestic legitimacy and formal international recognition often face limitations in legal and political acceptance. Strategically, this deal may not advance Afghanistan's long-term national interests and could pull the country deeper into regional and global power competitions.
Pitfalls of the MoU
Every country has the right to establish relations and cooperate with others. However, Afghanistan's current geopolitical circumstances demand particular caution. Major powers rarely engage in strategic cooperation primarily for Afghanistan's benefit; they typically pursue their own national priorities.
At present, Russia does not appear willing or able to provide Afghanistan the level of economic, military, or political support that would mark a true strategic partnership. This raises the question: if Russia is considered a strategic partner, what opportunities or threats are driving this relationship?
The growing ties between Russia and the Taliban seem to stem from immediate security and political considerations, not from a deep strategic partnership. For Russia and China, the primary concern in Afghanistan is preventing extremist groups from using its territory to threaten their interests and curbing drug flows through the region. Additionally, neither country has major economic investments in Afghanistan to justify a long-term strategic commitment.
Historical experience also shows that after the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan and its subsequent collapse, Russia did not provide significant military or economic support to successive Afghan governments. There is little evidence Moscow is now prepared to offer enough aid to substantially change Afghanistan's economic or security situation.
For the Taliban, they are trying to strengthen Afghanistan's position amid rising tensions with Pakistan. Recent cross-border clashes and attacks inside Afghan territory have raised concerns about sovereignty, security, and regional stability.
At the same time, Afghanistan's military capacity has severely declined. Most of the military equipment inherited from the previous government is a mix of U.S. and Russian systems. The U.S. is unlikely to provide maintenance or spare parts, leaving American gear non-repairable. Meanwhile, Soviet-era or Russian-made equipment is outdated or non-operational. In this context, expecting a security MoU with Russia to deliver substantial military support may be unrealistic. The deal could yield limited tangible benefits but risks dragging Afghanistan into regional geopolitical rivalries.
Afghanistan can hardly maintain strategic relationships with countries that have directly conflicting interests, such as India and Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine, or the U.S., China, and Iran. As a relatively weak and vulnerable state in a competitive geopolitical environment, Afghanistan risks becoming a victim of great-power competition rather than a beneficiary of international cooperation.
The Need for Domestic Legitimacy
The Taliban may view agreements like the MoU with Russia as a way to bolster their international standing, but such efforts are unlikely to address the fundamental challenge of legitimacy. International legitimacy begins with domestic legitimacy. Governments lacking broad acceptance, political inclusivity, and representative institutions face major obstacles in achieving meaningful international recognition.
The fact is that most countries will find it difficult to formally recognize the Taliban administration unless there is a major shift in the stance of the U.S. and major Western powers. While Russia and China have expanded ties with the Taliban, neither has succeeded in removing Taliban leaders from the U.N. sanctions list. As long as key Taliban figures remain under U.N. sanctions, full international recognition will be difficult.
For Afghanistan today, the priority is not strategic alignment with competing great powers, but addressing domestic political shortcomings and building genuine legitimacy. The guiding principle for any Afghan government should be simple: Afghanistan threatens no other country, and regional and global powers do not turn Afghanistan into an arena for geopolitical competition. Instead of a battlefield for competing interests, Afghanistan should strive to become a platform for regional connectivity, trade, and cooperation.
Achieving that vision requires a legitimate, representative, and rule-of-law-based political system. Without transparent governance, political inclusivity, and public accountability, outside countries will approach Afghanistan mainly through short-term geopolitical calculations and security arrangements, not genuine long-term partnerships. History shows such arrangements rarely serve Afghanistan's sustainable national interests.
Ultimately, Afghanistan's future stability and international standing will depend less on security memoranda with great powers and more on building a political order that earns the trust and support of its own people. Only then can Afghanistan transform from an arena of competition into a bridge for regional cooperation, economic development, and lasting stability.
