Syria's Strategy of Restraint Toward Israel Carries Hidden Risks

Last week, Israel continued its attacks on Syrian territory as its forces shelled a hill near Beit Jinn in the western outskirts of Damascus and raided a village in Quneitra province. These attacks came just days after Israeli fighter jets struck the Abu al-Duhur military base in northern Syria, causing significant damage.

Israel said the airstrike was meant to prevent Turkey from potentially deploying troops there, though both Damascus and Ankara rejected that claim. Israeli attacks have persisted despite Syrian diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and Washington's criticism of the Abu al-Duhur strike.

While avoiding confrontation, the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa has reiterated its demand that Israel withdraw from occupied Syrian territory, insisting that Damascus must be free to rebuild its armed forces and cooperate with partners of its choosing.

This reflects more than just Syria's military weakness. It underscores the new leadership's belief that sovereignty can be restored by first rebuilding state capacity. However, this strategy carries inherent risks: Israel could continue encroaching on Syrian sovereignty while exploiting Damascus's restraint, and the Syrian government could ultimately lose credibility with its own people and the broader Arab public, who view Israel as a threat.

Syria's vulnerabilities are real. In late 2024, after the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad's military, Israel struck strategic military targets across the country. The new government had to start building a national security architecture from fragmented institutions and militia groups. Currently, it is hard to envision a Syrian military response that would alter Israel's behavior.

Instead, al-Sharaa has prioritized economic recovery and international legitimacy. The government is focused on rebuilding state institutions, restructuring the security sector, restoring energy supplies, improving foreign relations, and reintegrating Syria into the global economy. Yet reconstruction is a monumental challenge.

According to World Bank estimates, rebuilding Syria's damaged infrastructure will cost around $216 billion. A state facing such immense needs cannot restore its power solely through military institutions. It needs revenue, electricity, a functioning bureaucracy, banking access, investment, and international ties.

Al-Sharaa has made significant strides internationally. In 2025, Washington lifted comprehensive sanctions on Syria, while the European Union also removed economic measures, though targeted and security-related restrictions remain. On August 24, Washington also removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, clearing another major obstacle to financial normalization and investment.

For Damascus, these steps expand the resources the state can use to govern the country; they are not merely economic dividends from avoiding war. This also raises the stakes in the dispute with Israel. Syria's reconstruction strategy now depends heavily on the international access that years of isolation denied. A major military escalation with Israel could undermine investor confidence, complicate Syria's reintegration into the international banking system, and weaken the diplomatic support on which recovery relies.

It could also bring renewed political pressure from Washington and the EU, though that would not automatically lead to reimposing comprehensive sanctions.

The dilemma is thus becoming clearer: restraint helps Damascus maintain the international environment needed for state-building, but it also enables Israel to limit the military and strategic capabilities Syria is trying to rebuild.

Israel has security concerns about Syria's new government, whose leaders come from an armed Islamist movement, and growing worries about Turkey's military ties with Damascus. But Israeli demands go far beyond preventing hostile forces from reaching its borders.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for the demilitarization of Syria's Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda provinces. His government also opposes the deployment of the new Syrian military south of Damascus and seeks to limit the scope of military cooperation between Damascus and Ankara.

Israel clearly wants to curtail Syria's military reconstruction. It views this intervention through a lens of preventive security. Damascus sees the issue in terms of sovereignty: a state that cannot decide where its army deploys or with whom it trains has yet to restore its strategic autonomy.

This is a central risk in al-Sharaa's strategy. Syria is avoiding an unwinnable confrontation to rebuild state power, while those very capabilities become the target of Israeli pressure.

There are limits to what restraint can achieve. Syria enjoys support from other Arab states, and the U.S. and EU back the reconstruction of an effective Syrian state as part of their regional stability approach. Damascus has also repeatedly expressed interest in a security arrangement with Israel. Yet none of this has stopped Israeli military operations.

Another risk concerns Syrian public opinion. A prolonged inability to respond to Israeli attacks could eventually erode al-Sharaa's standing and the government's legitimacy.

A major survey conducted by Arab Center Washington DC in 2025 found that 74% of Syrians oppose recognizing Israel, 70% reject any deal that does not include the return of the Golan Heights, and 88% believe Israel threatens Syria's security and stability. At the same time, 61% think the current government's foreign policy reflects the views of the Syrian people.

These findings matter precisely because they complicate the picture. The survey was conducted before recent confrontations and does not indicate whether Syrians support military retaliation. It sets political red lines, not a public demand for war.

Broader Arab polls point similarly. Among countries surveyed in the 2025 Arab Opinion Index, opposition to recognizing Israel remains overwhelming.

That said, Syria under the Assad family often avoided direct confrontation with Israel while maintaining a reputation as part of the regional “resistance” camp. That old model combined avoidance of direct war with alliances and armed networks that gave Damascus regional leverage.

Al-Sharaa's government appears to be making a different bet, focusing on strengthening institutions, economic recovery, international access, and a rebuilt national army. This is not a substitute for territorial sovereignty. It is an effort to rebuild the means to exercise sovereignty.

This bet will be harder to defend, domestically and internationally, if restored state capacity does not eventually give Syria greater control over its territory, security choices, and foreign relations.