Pakistan's Airstrikes on Afghanistan: Beyond TTP, What Other Motives?

Since October 2025, Pakistan has carried out multiple airstrikes on Afghan territory, causing heavy civilian casualties and extensive destruction. According to UN data, the most severe attack occurred on March 16, 2026, when a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul was bombed, killing 269 civilians and injuring 122 others.

In a report published on July 21, Amnesty International called on Pakistani authorities to explain the attack and urged an investigation into it as a possible war crime.

Pakistan states that its military operations target Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, which Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban government of harboring. The Afghan Taliban denies such allegations, insisting that TTP's insurgency is an internal Pakistani matter. However, the airstrikes so far have not killed any senior TTP leaders or commanders. This raises the question: Is TTP truly the root cause of the conflict, or are there other underlying reasons?

The roots of the crisis lie within Pakistan

TTP's origins are rooted within Pakistani territory. In November 1994, a cleric named Sufi Mohammad led an armed uprising in Swat and Malakand to impose Sharia law, marking the first cleric-led campaign in the country. Thirteen years later, Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan unified various militant factions under the TTP banner. Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah, led the group from 2013 until his death in a US drone strike in 2018. Thus, the movement that became TTP predates the Afghan Taliban.

Over the past two decades, Pakistan's military has conducted nearly a dozen major operations against this militant group. Yet TTP persists, not only because of its resilience or ideological appeal, but also due to Pakistan's distinction between "good" and "bad" militants. Islamabad's covert support for insurgencies in Afghanistan—aimed at weakening and eventually toppling the former Western-backed Afghan government—has maintained militant networks and infrastructure from which TTP also benefits.

Pakistan has long been accused of using armed groups to pursue geostrategic goals in Afghanistan and against India. After the 1978 communist coup in Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion the following year, Pakistan became a key Western ally, especially for the US, in containing Soviet influence. At that time, Pakistan hosted Afghan opposition figures, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had fled under President Mohammad Daoud Khan.

With US backing, Pakistan became the primary base supporting Afghan mujahideen fighters. Indigenous resistance groups became increasingly dominated by factions backed by Pakistan and the West. The Pakistani military established training centers along the Durand Line, where locals suffered systematic radicalization. Thousands of religious schools (madrasas) were set up, literature glorifying jihad was distributed, and locals were encouraged to join the Afghan mujahideen. Many were later mobilized to fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against the US and the previous Afghan government.

After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan's military under General Pervez Musharraf publicly yielded to US pressure and joined the "War on Terror," yet continued to support certain armed factions it deemed useful. The discovery of Osama bin Laden near Islamabad, where US special forces killed him in 2011, remains a notorious symbol of Pakistan's dual strategy.

Many analysts therefore question whether Pakistan truly intends to eliminate TTP and other armed networks. They argue that Islamabad still considers certain groups strategic assets and does not seek to eradicate militancy entirely, but rather to control it below a manageable threshold—like a controlled insurgency.

If TTP is not the only reason for Pakistan's airstrikes on Afghanistan, what broader objectives is Islamabad pursuing?

From "strategic depth" to "strategic dominance"

Pakistan has not abandoned its long-standing goal of seeking "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. This tradition means cultivating a friendly government in Kabul that could provide political and military space for Pakistan vis-à-vis India. Today, however, this policy appears to have evolved into an ambition for strategic dominance, treating Afghanistan not as an independent, sovereign neighbor, but as an extension of Pakistan's security belt.

This attitude is reflected in a recent social media post by Pakistan's former special envoy to Afghanistan, Asif Durrani. He argued that Taliban's increased ties with India "harm Pakistan's interests," while Afghan territory hosting armed groups would cross Pakistan's "red line." Durrani provided no evidence that India is using Afghan soil against Pakistan, but his comments reflect Islamabad's view that even normal diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and India are perceived as a threat.

Afghanistan has historically remained neutral in India-Pakistan disputes, including on Kashmir, and sided with neither in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Yet Pakistan still expects Afghanistan to view India through Islamabad's security lens and limit its foreign relations accordingly.

The Central Asian dimension

Former Pakistani senator and political analyst Afrasiab Khattak suggests that Pakistan is pursuing a Western agenda to counter Russian and Chinese influence. According to him, Islamabad backs the Taliban not only to gain power in Afghanistan but also with the expectation that militancy would spread into Central Asia. Khattak argues that recent tensions partly stem from the Taliban administration's unwillingness to facilitate such instability.

Khattak also contends that Pakistan is using TTP as a pretext for attacks while seeking to bring US troops back to Afghanistan. In September 2025, US President Donald Trump declared Washington wanted to regain Bagram Air Base, citing its strategic proximity to China. Days later, Trump warned of "bad" consequences if Afghanistan did not return the base to the US.

The following month, Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul and Paktika significantly escalated hostilities. Khattak argues that Islamabad is ultimately seeking a counterterrorism monitoring mechanism that would grant it greater latitude to intervene in Afghanistan and pursue its objectives in Central Asia and beyond.

Suppression of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism

According to Khattak and several regional analysts, Pakistan regards Pashtun and Baloch nationalism—rather than the Afghan Taliban or even TTP—as a more fundamental threat. Khattak asserts that TTP undermines Pashtun nationalist movements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan has therefore left the southern districts of the province to TTP's control.

Pakistan's intelligence agencies are also accused of using gunmen to assassinate tribal elders, Pashtun nationalists, and political activists who have criticized state policies and demanded greater rights. According to Pakistan's Human Rights Commission, nearly 1,200 tribal elders were killed in North and South Waziristan between 2004 and 2014. Instead of addressing the legitimate grievances of Pashtuns and Baloch, authorities often portray vocal critics as foreign "pawns."

The same coercive logic shapes Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan. Islamabad has used political, economic, and military pressure to force the Taliban administration to act as it wishes. Mass deportations and mistreatment of Afghan refugees, closures of trade and transit borders, and airstrikes killing civilians have all failed and proven counterproductive.

The roughly 2,600-kilometer Durand Line has been fenced off, severing longstanding tribal and social ties. Border closures have disrupted trade and livelihoods for millions on both sides. Yet militancy has increased; TTP and Baloch armed groups continue their deadly campaigns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Pakistan must resolve its internal issues itself

The tribal regions along the Durand Line were once a buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India, and later Pakistan. They remained semi-autonomous until their merger into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018. Decades of military operations have cost locals their lives, homes, and livelihoods, driving them away from a state that many now view as an occupying force. TTP still maintains a significant presence inside Pakistan, from which it can organize and launch attacks.

The situation in the tribal areas and Balochistan increasingly resembles the final years of the former Afghan government, when the Taliban controlled much of southern and western Afghanistan while the administration held only provincial and district centers.

Instead of blaming outside parties, Pakistan should abandon its failed military strategy and address internal crises through dialogue and political engagement. Armed groups retain territory, manpower, and some local support, while the suffering endured by tribal communities continues to fuel resentment and TTP recruitment.

Continued military adventurism against Afghanistan will deepen regional instability, strengthen non-state armed groups, and have serious long-term consequences for Pakistan itself.