US Uses 'Terrorism' Label to Interfere in Brazil's Election

In a controversial move, the US administration has officially designated Brazil's two largest criminal organizations, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), as “terrorist organizations.” According to an analysis by Al Jazeera, this action is not merely a law enforcement matter but reflects deeper Washington interference in Brazil's political and security landscape.

The designation comes as Brazil's far-right, particularly the Bolsonaro family, seeks to draw the US into an internal political struggle against President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government. Analysts suggest the decision reflects a dangerous convergence between Washington's long-standing interventionist habits in Latin America and the interests of Brazil's far-right, evoking memories of the US-backed dictatorship from 1964 to 1985.

PCC and CV do cause large-scale violence and are among the most powerful criminal networks in the region, threatening Brazil's public security. However, experts argue that extreme violence alone does not automatically make an organization “terrorist.” Terrorism is generally understood as politically or ideologically motivated violence. While PCC and CV may corrupt institutions, exert political influence, or confront the state when necessary, their primary objectives are criminal power and profit, not regime change.

The question arises: why is Washington acting now, when both PCC (founded in the early 1990s) and CV (with a longer history) are not newly discovered threats? Both organizations and their harms have been known to both Brasilia and Washington for decades. Analysts say the answer seems to lie in Brazil's domestic politics rather than a reassessment of the threat level.

The timing is hardly separable from the Bolsonaro family's efforts to enlist Washington in their political fight. Former President Jair Bolsonaro is facing a 27-year and 3-month prison sentence for an attempted coup after his 2022 election defeat. His sons have taken this battle to the US. Flavio Bolsonaro, one of his sons, has lobbied for months to portray Lula as “soft” on organized crime, while directly pushing the Trump administration to place PCC and CV on the terrorism list. His brother Eduardo Bolsonaro, who lives in the US, has even campaigned for sanctions against Brazil's Supreme Court justices and tariffs on Brazilian goods. On June 16, Brazil's Supreme Court sentenced Eduardo to 4 years and 2 months in prison for coercion in this campaign.

Flavio Bolsonaro's lobbying also carries direct electoral significance. He is Lula's main rival in the upcoming October election. According to a CNT/MDA poll on August 11, Lula leads the first round with 42.4% while Flavio has 28.7%. In this context, the terrorism label serves a crucial political function, reinforcing the far-right's narrative that Lula is either unwilling or too connected to organized crime. The goal is not necessarily to prove the allegations but to create an atmosphere of suspicion to exploit domestically and justify deeper US involvement.

Far-right protests in Brazil often feature Bolsonaro supporters waving US flags and calling for military intervention, reflecting a political trend increasingly viewing Washington as an ally in internal struggles. This strategy is not new, as far-right movements worldwide blur the lines between crime, migration, political opposition, and terrorism, turning security language into a tool to legitimize extraordinary measures.

The designation of PCC and CV as terrorists also gives the US more power to freeze assets, impose sanctions, and prosecute individuals allegedly supporting these groups. This creates new compliance obligations for companies operating in Brazil and subjects financial networks to stricter scrutiny. Banks may have no direct ties to PCC or CV but must still prove their systems are not used to transfer funds linked to these groups. Tracing through customers, third parties, shell companies, and complex payment chains is extremely difficult.

The financial issue also intersects with a separate dispute between the US and Brazil over PIX, the instant payment system run by Brazil's central bank, which has become a major competitor to Visa and Mastercard. Washington has examined PIX in the context of broader trade disputes, while Flavio Bolsonaro has proposed limiting PIX's future connectivity with non-Western payment systems. The designation of PCC and CV could add another layer of scrutiny if funds linked to these groups are found moving through PIX.

Brazilian security officials warn the designation could complicate long-standing police cooperation channels with the US. Joint investigations into PCC and CV rely heavily on routine intelligence sharing, but classifying these groups as “terrorist” could shift some investigations into more restricted national security channels, making cooperation more difficult rather than enhancing it.

More broadly, the designation sets a precedent for deeper US intervention in Brazil's security policy. History shows that during the Cold War, Washington often justified interventions by framing internal political conflicts as part of the ideological struggle against communism. Today, counterterrorism is replacing anti-communism as the rationale for intervention, even as Trump and the far-right have revived communist fears, applying them to almost anything left of them. The vocabulary has changed, but the logic is strikingly similar: Washington defines the threat unilaterally and exports that definition abroad, creating new avenues for political influence within sovereign nations.

Brazil has a serious organized crime problem requiring robust law enforcement, international cooperation, and institutional reform. However, analysts argue that effective crime-fighting requires understanding their true nature, not turning them into something politicians wish them to be. PCC and CV are dangerous precisely because they are sophisticated criminal enterprises. The “terrorism” label may offer political advantages, but it risks obscuring the true nature of the threat. Washington is turning a complex domestic security issue into a geopolitical and ideological battleground. And in Latin America, history suggests that when Washington begins redefining internal matters through the lens of its own political interests, sovereignty is often the first casualty.