Libya: Can the UN-Brokered '4+4' Deal Heal Divisions?

Representatives of Libya's rival political factions signed a landmark agreement in Tripoli in late August, outlining a roadmap that could lead to presidential and legislative elections within 24 months.

The '4+4' agreement, mediated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), aims to resolve prolonged legal and institutional disputes that have paralyzed the country since 2011. However, amid deep mistrust, shifting alliances, and entrenched armed groups, the path from signed text to unified government remains fraught with obstacles.

Two Decades of Division

Libya has faced near-constant instability since the 2011 uprising that toppled and killed longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Initially, the country showed political promise, but divisions soon emerged within the rebel movement, mainly between factions controlling the east and west.

In August 2012, the National Transitional Council formally handed power to the newly elected General National Congress, in what was considered Libya's only peaceful post-election transfer of power.

But that fragile democratic momentum quickly collapsed into armed conflict. In May 2014, rebel military commander Khalifa Haftar seized control of Benghazi and has since maintained control over eastern Libya.

A disputed election later that year led some newly elected lawmakers to form the House of Representatives and relocate to the eastern city of Tobruk under Haftar's military protection.

Political divisions turned into open war in April 2019 when Haftar launched a 14-month campaign to capture Tripoli, home to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). The offensive failed.

By June 2020, frontlines stabilized near the strategic central city of Sirte, leading to a formal ceasefire later that year, freezing military operations but leaving underlying political fissures unresolved.

Rivals and Leaders

Libya currently has two separate administrations operating within its territory.

Tripoli hosts the internationally recognized GNA, led by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. This western authority includes the State Council—an advisory legislative body led by Mohammed Takala—and the Presidential Council chaired by Mohammad al-Manfi.

In Tobruk and Benghazi, political power centers on the House of Representatives, headed by Speaker Aguila Saleh, which supports a parallel administration in the east. But actual control in the east and south rests with the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Khalifa Haftar.

In recent years, Haftar's son, Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, has assumed a crucial role in the eastern structure, emerging as a potential successor, a key military commander, and a central political negotiator.

Profiting from Chaos

Despite the 2020 ceasefire, political unity has remained elusive due to failed international initiatives and systemic economic competition. The UN-brokered Skhirat agreement of 2015 created the GNA.

But it also maintained rival legislative bodies, leading to institutional duplication and a country split between two powers.

A subsequent UN political process appointed Dbeibah to lead an interim executive in 2021, with the condition of holding national elections by year's end.

Under that deal, Dbeibah agreed not to run, but the 2021 elections collapsed just two days before they were due, as he reneged on his pledge.

Global Diplomatic Efforts

A significant factor in the new deal is the involvement of major powers. Under US President Donald Trump, Washington intensified efforts to mediate a unification deal, led by White House advisor Massad Boulos and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Boulos proposed an initiative offering US energy investment in Libyan oil fields in exchange for a unified executive. Washington even suggested a power-sharing arrangement where Dbeibah could remain prime minister while Saddam Haftar took the presidency.

This diplomatic push coincided with an extensive international tour by Saddam Haftar, who held high-level meetings in various regional and Western capitals.

Haftar met French President Emmanuel Macron and held direct talks with key Arab leaders, as well as meeting US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to discuss institutional unification.

Regional dynamics have also shifted as Turkey expanded military and technical cooperation with Saddam Haftar and the eastern administration. Joint military exercises between eastern and western forces in Sirte, under US supervision, illustrated the changing landscape.

A Historic Breakthrough?

The newly signed '4+4' agreement is viewed by analysts as a deliberate attempt to balance power between east and west.

The committee's eight-member composition reflects this: two from the House of Representatives, two from the State Council, two from Dbeibah's government, and two from Haftar's eastern command.

The deal calls for presidential and parliamentary elections within 24 months under a unified executive.

It also seeks to resolve key legal disputes that wrecked the 2021 elections by allowing dual citizens to run for president—provided the winner renounces foreign citizenship before taking the oath.

Additionally, it permits military officers to run if they resign from official positions. Both legal changes appear designed to clear a path for Saddam or Khalifa Haftar—reportedly US citizens and commanders in the self-styled LNA—to hold official government positions.

The agreement also restructures the High National Elections Commission under new leadership and establishes formal rotating sessions in Tripoli (west), Benghazi (east), and Sabha (south).

Analyst Wissam Abdul Kabir argues that the direct involvement of armed groups sets this agreement apart from previous ones.

"I believe what makes the difference is that, for the first time, the agreement is signed between parties operating on the ground," Abdul Kabir told Al Jazeera. "In previous agreements, whether Geneva 2021 or Skhirat 2015, the agreement was signed between two councils or between legal or elected bodies whose legitimacy faded over time. So the difference is that this agreement is approved, passed, and signed by the parties holding real power on the ground—that's the core point."

Yet many Libyans view '4+4' as just one in a series of failed peace initiatives.

State Council leader Mohammed Takala boycotted the signing ceremony, while Presidential Council head Mohammad al-Manfi publicly criticized the lack of transparency in procedures and external interference.

Political analyst Mohammed Mahfouz believes the agreement seems to be an attempt by outside powers to consolidate power for Saddam Haftar and Dbeibah.

"The issue is not limited to candidate conditions. The most important framework is that we are facing a scenario repeating every trial since 2015 with the Skhirat Agreement in Morocco, and then Tunis and Geneva in 2021," Mahfouz told Al Jazeera. "Back then, they always said these political agreements were signed between actively operating parties... but Libyans never got to vote."

Despite promises of new elections, there is little hope that Libya's current leaders will cede power if they lose at the ballot box.

"Can we believe in the hypothesis that the parties holding power and money, and who today gain new legitimacy under this deal plus greater power, will simply accept being stripped of power after two years and lead us to elections?" Mahfouz asked. "There's a firm belief that whoever comes to power in Libya cannot give up an inch, unless forced by arms, unfortunately."