Controlling Mali may be a distant ambition, but rebels have enough power to pressure a weakened government

When Islamist fighters linked to al-Qaida launched a series of attacks on military bases and raided major towns in Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso last summer, observers said they were inspired by their comrades in Syria—those who toppled Bashar al-Assad's regime and took power about six months earlier.

Despite tactical successes that earned them the fearsome nickname "Ghost Army," capturing large swaths of territory and blockading cities and armies from fuel and supplies, the chances for Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) to completely defeat Mali's military regime and its roughly one thousand Russian mercenaries hired to protect it remain low.

This week, few thought the regime of Assimi Goïta—the soldier who took power in Mali in 2021—would last long. Still, most analysts believe the Islamist fighters and their separatist allies will seek to force the government into concessions rather than gain full control over this chaotic, impoverished, and violent African nation.

Recent days have seen a fierce wave of violence in Mali, shocking even for the Sahel region—a belt stretching below the Sahara from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This region has been devastated in recent years by successive coups, extremism, humanitarian crises, and war. Major peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions by the UN, US, and France from 2012 to 2022 all failed. Few outside powers want to get involved again.

The coordinated attack launched by JNIM and its allies among Mali's Tuareg minority community last weekend was carefully planned and orchestrated. They targeted the government army and Russian auxiliary forces with ambushes, car bombs, drones, and conventional weapons, inflicting heavy losses. One of those losses was Mali's Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, killed in a suicide attack on his residence in the garrison town of Kati. Another was the head of military intelligence.

Other attacks targeted Bamako's international airport, while JNIM fighters and Tuareg separatists seized control of the northern town of Kidal after soldiers fled and Russian mercenaries surrendered. This defeat reversed a major symbolic victory the military government had achieved in Mali three years earlier.

Jean-Hervé Jezequel, director of the Sahel project at the International Crisis Group, described this as "a major escalation in the conflict, a new phase that armed groups have achieved in their strategy to push them to attack Mali's main urban centers in recent years."

There are deeper causes for this new wave of violence. The Sahel combines factors that lead to violent extremism: extreme poverty, instability, sectarian tensions, and a history of decades-long conflict leaving a massive stockpile of weapons.

Last year, nearly 70% of deaths from terrorism occurred in just five countries, three of which are in the Sahel region.

Another driving factor is the brutal counterinsurgency tactics systematically employed by the army and Russian mercenaries across the region, and above all the failure of governments to provide basic services and security.

One country after another, the fighters have exploited this by offering protection and some basic support, while coercing communities to accept their authority and harsh Islamic rules. Expansion is vital to their campaign. Controlling the population means they can recruit young men and use mosques to cement influence and power. Controlling roads and rivers allows them to tax traffic and use routes for lucrative smuggling.

Ulf Laessing, who runs the Sahel program of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany) from Bamako, said JNIM's main focus is to create a territory within Mali, allowing them to build "their own state in some kind of autonomy," much like al-Sharaa and HTS did in Syria before launching their lightning offensive to topple the al-Assad regime.

The tactical alliance with the Tuareg separatists fits with a strategy initiated by al-Qaida—to which JNIM may be loosely loyal—encouraging fighters to build relationships with communities. However, according to analysts, this alliance is unlikely to survive if they win.

Laessing said JNIM and other Islamist groups are "testing the walls of the regime everywhere."

"I don't think Bamako will fall… JNIM cannot control big cities, but they can force the government to its knees, negotiate with them, and force them to adopt more of their ideology," he said.

"JNIM plays a long game. They are simply waiting until state power erodes further."