Israel and Türkiye: A Regional Order Being Reshaped

On Tuesday, Israeli fighter jets struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, triggering a wave of criticism from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and several regional countries. The Israeli government claimed it had intelligence indicating Turkish troops were moving to the site.

In a subsequent interview, US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said Washington had received this intelligence from Israel six days before the attack. However, after conducting its own review, US intelligence found no basis for the claim.

Türkiye's Response

Viewing Israel's strike on the Syrian base as a provocative act, Ankara has avoided escalation and sought to defuse tensions. Türkiye has not confined the issue to bilateral relations but placed it within the context of Israel's relations with the US, regional consensus, and international opinion.

Normally, Türkiye and Israel have a de-escalation mechanism. However, according to Barrack, Israel did not warn Türkiye about the attack, which could have triggered a military response. The US diplomat called for establishing a de-escalation mechanism, but such a mechanism only works when the parties involved genuinely want it. In this case, there is no indication Israel seeks to de-escalate; escalation appears to be the goal, as Israel neither informed Türkiye nor the US, and acted on a pretext US intelligence deems baseless—a move widely seen as aimed at boosting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's election campaign.

After the US imposed a ceasefire on the Iran front, Netanyahu is likely to seek escalation on other fronts, such as Syria, Lebanon, or Gaza, ahead of Israeli elections. The challenge for Türkiye is to avoid falling into Netanyahu's trap while preventing such aggression from becoming normalized. This requires direct intervention by US President Donald Trump to restrain Netanyahu. A trilateral de-escalation mechanism can only work and be credible if the US truly backs it strongly.

International Consensus on Syria

Even with a mechanism in place, Syria has already changed how Türkiye and Israel perceive each other. For a long time, the root of Türkiye's disagreement with Israel was the Palestinian issue, which carried humanitarian, identity, and solidarity dimensions. Today, Ankara views Israel's efforts to undermine Syria's transition as having a direct impact on its national security. Türkiye no longer sees Israel only through the lens of the Palestinian issue but increasingly as a national security challenge, as Israeli revisionism threatens its interests.

From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East, Türkiye and Israel hold different policies, priorities, and threat perceptions. Syria serves as a microcosm of the two countries' divergent visions for regional order. Ankara wants a centralized, stable, and militarily capable Syria, while Israel prefers a weak, divided Syria without significant military strength.

This is not merely a clash between Turkish and Israeli visions. Israel is going against regional and international consensus on Syria. The US, UK, Europe, and regional states all support a centralized and stable government in Damascus. Ironically, the only regional country that might also want Syria weak or collapsed is Iran.

Like any sovereign state, Syria will have an army. If Israel believes its security can only be ensured by keeping neighbors or the region weak, divided, and militarily incapable, that is a recipe for perpetual war and regional and international isolation. Weakening the Syrian state and failing the transition would open the door to non-state actors and extremism, harming the entire region, including Israel. Neighboring Lebanon is a warning: Israel's occupation and the weakness of the Lebanese state facilitated the emergence and growth of Hezbollah.

The Post-Abraham Order

Israel's and Türkiye's visions for regional order are also opposed. The recent Mecca Pact bringing Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan closer is not inherently anti-Israel. However, it represents a regional shift showing the failure of the order imagined in the Abraham Accords, or similar initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the India-Israel-UAE-US strategic partnership (I2U2).

The Abraham vision of regional order was based on Arab-Israeli normalization and cooperation under the security umbrella of the US, alongside hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Türkiye, and de-emphasizing the Palestinian issue. In essence, this vision focused more on Israel and its normalization than on Arab states and their needs and priorities.

With its aggressive and revisionist policies, Israel has deepened its risk of regional isolation, raised the cost of any normalization process, and rendered the Abraham—or Israel-centric—vision of regional order meaningless. Israel's revisionism not only distances it from other major regional states but also underscores the gap between Israel and the US on the question of regional restructuring.

While Israel opposes the Mecca Pact, President Trump has welcomed it, possibly seeing it as aligned with a strategy of burden-sharing with regional allies and lending wider legitimacy and acceptance. The US stance may reflect a shift in Washington's regional vision. Over the past decade, the US invested heavily in creating a regional order based on Israel and the Gulf states, but that was essentially an Israel-centric project. That vision is no longer viable, and no one bears more responsibility for its collapse than Israel itself.