Iran 100 Days into War: The Victory of Survival

It has been 100 days since the U.S. and Israel launched a coordinated campaign aimed at regime change in Iran. Since April, a fragile ceasefire has been in place but is frequently violated by skirmishes. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed while fighting in Lebanon continues.

Washington and Tel Aviv's objective was not only to dismantle Iran's nuclear program but also to weaken its military and security apparatus, creating a window for internal political change. However, peace remains elusive as neither side has achieved its goals.

For Tehran, the primary goal has been to protect the ruling system and ensure its survival, regardless of the cost.

Losses on Both Sides

The war has claimed the lives of over 3,400 Iranian citizens, including dozens of senior political and military leaders. This reveals that Iran could not protect its leadership, arsenal, or nuclear program. Within the first two weeks of the conflict, Iran's missile and drone attacks dropped by 90% as U.S. and Israeli airstrikes destroyed launchers faster than they could be replaced, exposing the limits of a deterrence system built over two decades.

The nuclear program, already damaged during a 12-day war in 2025, was hit again. Civilian and energy infrastructure was destroyed, further crippling an already struggling economy.

The regional network of allies that Tehran had cultivated continues to erode. By targeting U.S. bases in Gulf states, Iran has alienated its neighbors.

But the war has also inflicted significant losses on its adversaries. Iranian missiles and drones struck multiple U.S. bases in the region, exposing the limits of Washington's protection. Gulf states were dragged into an unwanted conflict and attacked on their own soil. The security guarantees underpinning their alliance with the U.S. have become less credible. As a result, the war's most lasting impact could be instability in the regional security architecture, rather than direct damage to Iran's capabilities.

From Military Weakness to Economic Leverage

Within days of the U.S.-Israeli attack, Iran began restricting maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which handles about one-fifth of the world's seaborne crude oil and liquefied natural gas. The U.S. responded with an air campaign in March to reopen the route and imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports in April. Despite these efforts, the strait remains closed. Only ships inspected by Iran are allowed through.

Diplomatic difficulties have compounded the military situation. When Washington asked NATO and European and Asian partners to help reopen the route, they declined, viewing the conflict as beyond their responsibility. For Tehran, this shows that the power that struck at the heart of the Iranian state could not rally allies to reopen a shipping lane. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is seen not only as economic leverage but also as a political and strategic failure for the U.S. and Israel, evidence that the strategy of inflicting cost on the adversary is working.

Feeling emboldened, Iran rejected the U.S. demand for unconditional surrender and continued negotiations. Ongoing support from Russia and China, including at the United Nations, has helped Tehran frame the war as part of a larger struggle over the international order, rather than a isolated conflict.

On the home front, the Islamic Republic has maintained stability by projecting continuity. After the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his son Mojtaba was appointed successor within days. Although the new leader's prolonged absence from public view raises questions, the leadership has sustained an image of stability and cohesion.

What Comes Next

By its own criteria, Tehran considers itself in an advantageous position. The inability of its adversaries to topple the ruling system is paramount from the leadership's perspective; any other losses can be recovered as long as the Islamic Republic survives.

Iran now appears to seek transforming survival into a partial restoration of regional standing, particularly by linking any conflict resolution to ending the war in Lebanon. It wants to position itself as a participant in regional de-escalation. The goal is to prevent further erosion of influence and convert remaining leverage into continued involvement.

However, the failure of conventional military deterrence has reinforced the view among Iran's leadership that only a nuclear capability can deter U.S.-Israeli attacks. This perspective makes the nuclear issue harder to resolve and could complicate negotiations with the U.S.

Domestically, the war has now eclipsed the economic and governance grievances that fueled winter protests, replacing them with rhetoric centered on external threats and national resistance. The political leadership and security apparatus view the internal situation differently: the political side is aware of governance failures exposed by the protests, while the security side tends to see dissent and external pressure as a unified existential threat. This divergence, along with the war, will shape the direction of domestic politics: either toward more repression or toward reconciliation and recovery.

Several questions remain open: Can a leadership that views regime survival as victory achieve lasting peace? Or will it conclude that only a more assertive stance, and possibly nuclear weapons, can secure its future? The next 100 days may provide the answer.