Where Does Iran Stand on the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey Defense Pact?
Theo Al Jazeera English
Analysts say Iran is not directly threatened by the trilateral defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, while Iranian officials focus on the declining US role in the region. The pact, signed in Mecca, comes amid ongoing tensions after months of war, with experts suggesting Tehran is more concerned about long-term regional shifts than immediate dangers.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their joint defense pact to include Turkey, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the US and Iran have yet to reach a final agreement to end the war.
Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on one of the three countries would be considered an attack on all. The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, sparking a conflict that spread across the Gulf and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have been careful not to antagonize any regional or international party as they finalized what they describe as the result of years of effort and negotiations. The three countries stressed that the pact, which does not specify a particular threat, is not directed at any nation – especially Iran – and does not cancel or replace existing agreements with other parties.
In Tehran, the reaction has been largely muted, with officials focusing mainly on regional and Islamic cooperation and what they see as the declining role of the US. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims are united, they “can confront all challenges from malicious outsiders.” “The time has come to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral deal signed hours earlier.
But in the long term, Iran certainly has reasons for concern, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher on Iran and Middle East geopolitical dynamics at the Clingendael Institute. He told Al Jazeera that the timing is significant because the agreement comes after months of war in which Saudi Arabia suffered attacks from Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen and armed groups in neighboring Iraq.
“From Tehran's perspective, the concern is not only that the pact could enhance Saudi Arabia's deterrence capabilities, but also that it could facilitate coordinated pressure targeting Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkey and Pakistan,” he said.
On Sunday, the Houthis claimed a drone attack on the Aramco oil refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed it extinguished the fire without casualties but did not mention the cause. Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the port of al-Makha, controlled by the Saudi-backed government, killing at least 7 people, wounding 15, and severely damaging infrastructure.
A Powerful Bloc?
Iran's Foreign Ministry has not issued an official statement on the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey agreement, but a senior official outlined Tehran's diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday. Hossein Noushabadi, director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the ISNA news agency that the Ministry primarily views the agreement in the context of a declining direct US presence in the region.
The pact “is being seen as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf,” Noushabadi said. “It seems that in the near future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structure imposed by outsiders, signaling the end of the current security and geopolitical model and moving West Asia out of America's vital interests zone,” added the former Iranian ambassador to Oman.
Political scientist Vali Nasr argues that the pact is not currently a threat to Tehran. “Right now, all of this is elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” said the professor of international relations and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University. He also suggested it serves as a counterbalance to the Abraham Accords and a direct challenge to Tehran, particularly concerning US-backed regional normalization efforts with Israel.
Mehran Kamrava, professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, also agreed that Iranian policymakers do not feel immediately threatened, especially given they maintain friendly relations with both Pakistan and Turkey even under difficult circumstances. “In essence, this pact is not new, and at the present time, it has little substantive meaning beyond symbolism. For example, neither Turkey nor Pakistan is willing to join Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen despite the Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava said.
Not all within Iran's establishment are pleased with the pact. Some hardline lawmakers and media argue it could eventually target the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region and diminish Pakistan's credibility as a key intermediary between Iran, the US, and other parties.
“It is clear that Arab states have finally understood that security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said with a more hawkish tone. “Warning: miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every mistake has a price. Balance is the only path,” he wrote on X. Ebrahim Rezaei, another committee member, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan” would not bring security to Saudi Arabia, “just as years of one-sided reliance on the Americans did not bring them security.”
Is Iran Being Left Out?
Azizi of the Clingendael Institute believes Tehran's priority may be to avoid turning the pact into an overtly anti-Iran coalition in the context of a war with regional implications, meaning maintaining bilateral relations with each of the three countries. Tehran may also continue to emphasize its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be arranged by regional states rather than outside powers.
“If those countries view the pact as meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, it would make Iranian participation more difficult. However, in the long term, if the agreement evolves from a balancing alliance into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iran's inclusion could be viewed differently,” he said.
Experts also suggest that Iran might seek to join the pact in the distant future, but that would require a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region. Expansion to other Arab states seems more feasible in the short term, with Egypt already mentioned as a potential candidate, although such a decision could be complicated for Cairo.
Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, believes the trilateral pact reflects both short-term and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad, and Ankara. “They are driven to come together to enhance diplomatic and defense cooperation due to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism, and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.