Iran Threatens Southeast Europe, But Is It Feasible?

The war between the US-Israel and Iran has largely unfolded unexpectedly, as Washington's allies have shown reluctance and repeatedly warned of escalation risks. Tehran's response has also been surprising, particularly its missile strikes on non-combatant nations in the Gulf and, more recently, Jordan.

Beyond the Middle East, Iran's military is believed to have attempted attacks on targets as far as the joint US-UK military base on Diego Garcia, over 3,780 kilometers from Iran. Tehran has also recently threatened to target Southeast Europe, especially Bulgaria.

Bezmer Air Base: A US Stronghold in Bulgaria

In July, Bulgaria's parliament approved an agreement allowing the US to use Bezmer Air Base for refueling military aircraft—a support mechanism for the Pentagon's operations in the Middle East and against Iran.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned his Bulgarian counterpart that any nation supporting US "aggression" against Iran would be considered a legitimate target for retaliation. According to a recent Financial Times article citing anonymous Iranian sources, Tehran would consider striking Europe if Washington escalates the conflict.

Armida van Rij, a senior fellow at the Centre for European Reform, noted that Southeast Europe could be an attractive target for Iran: "This region is Europe's weak point, strategically important with numerous NATO bases, lying on key supply routes for Ukraine and bordering the Black Sea."

Angel Petrov, a journalist in Sofia covering Southeast Europe and the Middle East for Dnevnik.bg, said Bulgarians view the Iran war as a "distant" issue. They do not rate this conflict as highly as the Ukraine war, and the impact on oil prices seems acceptable compared to general inflation.

According to Petrov, the Sofia government lacks the institutional capacity to refuse Washington while dealing with the Ukraine war and an increasingly assertive Russia. So it's no surprise that Bulgarian officials have accommodated the Trump administration's request to use Bezmer base.

If Iran were to fire missiles at Bezmer, it could hope to raise the cost of Bulgaria's cooperation with the US and create a rift between the two nations. Bulgarians would then find themselves threatened by an Iran war they are indifferent to, due to a US ally that seems increasingly lukewarm about the Ukraine conflict they care more about.

Can Iran Reach Europe?

While Iranian missiles can certainly reach parts of Europe, whether such attacks would serve Tehran's goals is another matter.

Ali Bakir, a senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, assessed that an Iranian attack on Europe would benefit President Trump and further isolate Iran. Striking countries like Bulgaria would force Europe to open another front in a conflict many European leaders have refused to join, frustrating the US President.

Bakir suggested that dragging Europe into the Iran conflict could benefit Russia in its Ukraine campaign, by straining European military resources and "potentially triggering a larger, more dangerous war with severe economic and international security consequences."

For Tehran, threatening to attack a weaker European nation might hold more value than actually firing missiles toward Europe. Such a threat could shape European internal politics, keep attention on a conflict beyond the Ukraine war, and make European leaders and citizens more hesitant to passively support US military action against Iran.

Iran's declaration is aimed at decoupling Europe from the US campaign. However, an actual attack on an EU and NATO member would transform Europe from a bystander into a belligerent, triggering NATO Article 4—potentially leading to military response—and handing Washington a European alliance it has never managed to assemble.

For now, the logical conclusion is that Iran has shown restraint, calculating that a missile strike on Europe could hand Washington a strategic victory. Yet several factors keep the risk of an attack on Europe above zero.

First is the "credibility trap." After declaring any base used to attack Iranian territory a legitimate target, Tehran threatens to expand retaliation if further pressured by the US, but this threat only works if US allies believe Iran is truly willing to act.

Second, Iran might not see it as an attack on Europe but on US assets stationed on European soil. Tehran has used similar distinctions in missile attacks on Gulf states, which have denied that their people, civilians, and infrastructure should be targeted in a war they did not start, yet so far they have not retaliated directly against Iran.

Finally, the coherence of Iran's command-and-control system is crucial. If the decision to attack is not made by political strategists, the response could be unpredictable. The desire to retaliate against new US strikes by targeting perceived weaknesses could lead to overreach.

The longevity of the conflict may pose a greater threat to Europe than Iran's missile capabilities, which NATO's defense systems can protect against. As the war drags on, the real danger for Europe is a prolonged US-Iran conflict that Washington considers "dormant," causing financial repercussions on European streets and diverting support away from Russia and the Ukraine war.