Sudan battlefield: Army gains, RSF defections, and al-Burhan's political move

Sudan's civil war is showing signs of a shifting landscape. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have scored successive victories in North Kordofan state, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) face a fresh wave of defections, and the army's commander-in-chief and head of the transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has just opened a political track while reiterating that military operations continue.

The army's advances are putting pressure on RSF supply lines; the defections raise questions about the force's internal cohesion; and al-Burhan is seeking to shape a political process from a position strengthened by battlefield developments. However, the overall front still has many areas of intense fighting. The combination of military pressure, defections, and political outreach signals a pivotal moment: battlefield dynamics may be starting to influence the political balance.

What has the army gained?

The most visible recent victories have been in North Kordofan, a state in central Sudan that links the capital Khartoum to the country's western regions.

In late July, the army announced it had retaken Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, and Umm Sayala, among other locations in the state. Al Jazeera reported that these advances also helped secure the National Export Road, a vital artery connecting Khartoum via Omdurman to el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.

These wins do not mean full control of the Kordofan region, but they carry significance beyond the territory gained. Control of the Export Road bolsters the army's position in North Kordofan and increases pressure on RSF supply routes. According to Al Jazeera on 21 August, the army is continuing efforts to cut these supply lines as fighting spreads across Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile region.

What does the wave of RSF defections indicate?

Battlefield pressure coincides with a notable rise in defections from the RSF. On 20 August, the army announced that about 318 people, including four officers, had joined its ranks, arriving in the Northern state with around 50 fighting vehicles before moving to Omdurman. Al Jazeera also reported separate groups from Kordofan and Khartoum—270 people, including 21 field commanders, and 45 fighters and commanders from the Bara area—surrendered to the army.

Numbers alone do not tell the whole story; timing is what stands out. An Al Jazeera analysis from 21 August suggested the growing defection wave stems from multiple factors, including battlefield developments, internal RSF issues, social and tribal dynamics, and pressure from army advances aimed at disrupting supply lines. However, this trend does not yet mean the RSF is collapsing.

If the trend continues, it could become increasingly serious, especially if more commanders and fighters conclude that the battlefield balance is tilting against the RSF. The most cautious conclusion for now is that battlefield pressures may be eroding the RSF's cohesion, but not yet leading to widespread disintegration.

Why is al-Burhan opening a political channel?

The SAF chief's political initiative runs parallel to military developments. On 15 August, he announced the state would grant temporary immunity and legal, political, and security guarantees to those participating in a national dialogue managed by an independent national mechanism. Criminal proceedings against participants would be suspended during their involvement, but the rights of those who have filed complaints would not be abolished.

Al-Burhan said the initiative came from a group of Sudanese who approached him with a dialogue proposal. The group would independently manage the process, and the state would not dictate the agenda or outcomes. He also said he had begun consultations with national forces supportive of the state and institutions, aiming to bring them into completing state institutions, including the legislative council.

This is not, however, a step back from war. Al-Burhan said he would not accept what he called a “non-substantive peace” that brings RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his supporters to power. He also stressed that the path to peace begins with the RSF withdrawing from cities and concentrating in designated areas.

On 21 August, Al Jazeera reported al-Burhan declared fighting would continue until what he called the rebellion ends, while the army cuts RSF supply lines. He rejected a ceasefire that might allow the RSF to regroup, while declaring he remains open to a just peace and national dialogue that excludes the RSF.

Thus, al-Burhan is not choosing between war and politics but pursuing both: sustaining military pressure while opening a political process he says is aimed at protecting the state and its institutions.

What does Malik Agar's stance reveal?

Malik Agar, deputy head of the transitional Sovereignty Council, has further clarified the government's position. In an interview with Al Jazeera on 22 August, he said the current option is a military solution unless serious conditions for negotiation emerge. The RSF would have to withdraw from cities and residential areas before talks can begin, while emphasizing the government remains open to initiatives that preserve Sudan's unity and state institutions.

In a separate interview with Al Jazeera published on 23 August, Agar argued the army will win, but the war will ultimately end through negotiation. He contended Sudan's crisis stems from deeper issues, including the weakness of the state and the failure of the political elite to manage the country's ethnic, cultural, religious, and geographic diversity.

This stance reflects the government's broader calculus: maintain military pressure while keeping the door open for negotiation from a stronger battlefield position.

Can al-Burhan turn battlefield pressure into political leverage?

The army's victories in North Kordofan have strengthened its position along a key strategic route. The growing wave of RSF defections is raising questions about the force's cohesion. Meanwhile, the RSF remains active on multiple fronts, and the overall battlefield is still contested.

That combination makes recent developments significant beyond individual battles or defections. A shifting military balance could begin to shape the conditions for Sudan's next political phase. For al-Burhan, the potential advantage is not merely territorial. If military pressure continues to generate defections and undermine RSF cohesion, the army may gain more room to dictate who participates in the political process and the terms of future negotiations.

For the RSF, the challenge is not just holding ground but preventing battlefield pressure from becoming an internal cohesion crisis. That has not happened yet. Military defeat does not automatically translate into political exclusion.

The army's recent gains are best understood not as evidence of a decisive victory, but as a change in the conditions under which the next stage of the war—and eventually negotiations—may be conducted. The question is whether the RSF can contain the defection wave and maintain its bargaining position, or whether continued military pressure will hand al-Burhan greater leverage in Sudan's upcoming political phase.