Sudan's Military Victories Over RSF Unlikely to End Conflict

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have enjoyed a favorable summer, regaining control of several towns along the strategic export route linking the central Nile Valley to the west of the country, while pushing the RSF paramilitary forces onto the defensive in many areas. SAF leadership now believes it can completely defeat the RSF rather than merely contain the force.

However, developments in the east, in Blue Nile state, paint a different picture. In mid-August, the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu), retook the town of Kurmuk and gained control of Geisan within days. Sudanese military sources suggest these attacks were launched from across the Ethiopian border. Drone strikes on several army-controlled cities also demonstrate that the RSF's reach extends far beyond Darfur, the region considered its main stronghold.

The lesson of this summer is not that the SAF is on the verge of a decisive victory, but rather that military victory and political resolution are becoming two different things. Even if the RSF is completely defeated, the war in Sudan may not end but merely splinter into smaller conflicts.

Fragile Anti-RSF Alliance

The anti-RSF alliance is coordinated and led by the SAF, but the army depends on allied armed movements, including Darfuri factions that signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. These include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), headed by Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi. The agreement requires these forces to be integrated into the army, but they are hesitant to give up the military autonomy that underpins their political influence.

In March, army chief of staff Yasser al-Atta announced plans to activate mechanisms to organize and integrate irregular armed groups into the regular forces, but little progress has been made so far. Earlier, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Shams al-Din Kabbashi warned that the network of semi-autonomous militias, tribal alliances, and pro-SAF volunteers could become "the next threat" if not brought under control soon.

RSF Also Fracturing

On the RSF side, the coalition is cracking, with a wave of senior defections, including al-Nour al-Qubba and Hamad Khalifa, the RSF-appointed governor of Kordofan. When he left, al-Qubba took dozens of combat vehicles and a large number of fighters with him. The RSF has always been a loose alliance rather than a unified fighting force, so these defections cause the SAF as much concern as joy, as the defectors often arrive as independent forces loyal to their commanders, unaccustomed to a unified chain of command.

The case of Abu Aqla Keikel, an SAF-trained officer who initially fought for the army before defecting to the RSF and then returning to the SAF in October 2024, shows that his Sudan Shield Forces remain under his personal command rather than the army's.

Many commanders in the anti-RSF camp maintain a wide degree of operational independence and have their own political calculations. When the war ends and there is no common enemy to mask differences, this issue will become more apparent.

Islamist Forces and the Post-War Challenge

Islamist brigades such as al-Baraa ibn Malik, linked to the Sudanese Islamic Movement that backed Omar al-Bashir's government, have provided thousands of fighters and played a key role in retaking Khartoum. The U.S. has sanctioned this brigade, and the European Union has sanctioned its leader, al-Misbah Abu Zaid. Under this pressure and SAF's victories, some Islamist fighters have begun to withdraw. However, leaving the battlefield does not mean abandoning the political arena. Ahmed Haroun, chairman of the former ruling National Congress Party, said the Islamic Movement could support a prolonged period of army rule, aiming to return to government through "the ballot box."

The war itself has given Islamist fighters years of battlefield experience. There is little reason to believe that those who helped retake the capital would disarm immediately after the war without a political agreement that provides a roadmap for demobilization.

The Darfur Question

A structural issue that predates this war makes any victory claim difficult to believe. The Sudanese army has long struggled to maintain strength in remote border regions. Under al-Bashir, the government relied on the Janjaweed militia to counter the insurgency in Darfur. In 2013, many Janjaweed fighters were incorporated into the newly formed RSF.

A weakened, cash-strapped SAF, dependent on volunteers, Islamist militias, and Juba signatories, is unlikely to succeed in Darfur—an area the size of France, where the RSF still uses cross-border supply routes. Even if the RSF is defeated, their weapons and fighters will not vanish but will fall into the hands of those able to pick them up. Meanwhile, questions about the post-war period are opening up conflicts that the war is currently masking.