Tigray Conflict Escalates: Will Ethiopia's Neighbors Intervene?

After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces have entered Mekelle, the capital of Tigray state, while forces belonging to a rebel coalition including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) withdrew from the city. The development effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.

Yet the capture of Mekelle may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting continues elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering towns in northern Tigray add a dangerous regional dimension.

Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground troops to advance across Tigray. After successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside and declared they would keep fighting. TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said: "We will confront the enemy in the way and in the place we choose."

A war that may not be over

The current developments echo the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces later regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.

The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, especially if the TPLF and other armed groups turn the mountainous terrain into a protracted insurgency. Ethiopia is already grappling with insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the risk that federal forces will be stretched across multiple frontlines.

According to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, rebel battlefield losses could have effects far beyond Tigray, heightening concerns in Egypt and other Ethiopian rivals.

Ibrahim told Al Jazeera: "Egypt views the Renaissance Dam and any move by the Ethiopian military toward the Red Sea as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia to oppose any unilateral action by Ethiopia. Ethiopia is seeking sea access; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat."

Ethiopia's Red Sea ambitions

Ethiopia has had no coastline since Eritrea gained independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on its neighbors for access to international trade. Since 2023, Prime Minister Abiy has increasingly treated Red Sea access as a strategic priority, fueling concerns in Eritrea about Ethiopian ambitions, particularly regarding the port of Assab.

Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade while pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland. After being sworn in Monday for a new five-year term following his party's victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the center of a speech to parliament: "Based on the principle of give and take, we will work to ensure Ethiopia has access to the sea."

Loose regional alignments

In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have shared concerns about Ethiopia's regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met at a four-way consultative conference in New Alamein, Egypt, to discuss regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.

The meeting did not form a formal military alliance, and the four countries have differing interests in their relations with Addis Ababa. The conference's joint statement also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia's ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia-Eritrea relations have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying support for the opposition coalition. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they back the coalition.

The advance of Ethiopian troops into Tigray adds another layer of tension to that rivalry. Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami, said: "The advance of the Ethiopian military in Tigray directly threatens Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and the Eritrean state."

Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops in the 2020-2022 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias later soured. Reports indicate Eritrean troops have appeared in towns in northern Tigray, adding a significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press reported that Eritrean troops entered Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing the border into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the moves.

Eritrea's role could be decisive

For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as the outcome. A protracted conflict in Tigray could tie down Ethiopian forces and limit Addis Ababa's ability to pursue Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could give the federal government more freedom to focus on regional rivals.

Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher on the Horn of Africa, said: "With reports that Eritrean troops are advancing into Tigray, Eritrea appears to want to reinforce the TPLF forces withdrawing northward, so that clashes between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers take place on Tigrayan territory, not in Eritrea." That could create incentives for Eritrea to support forces capable of tying down the Ethiopian military without necessarily confronting it directly.

Sudan adds another layer of complexity

The war in Sudan adds another dimension to the regional rivalry. According to Reuters, Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to the Sudanese army, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.

Ethiopia has been accused of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation published in February said Ethiopia is hosting a camp in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF are trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, saying the United Arab Emirates funded the camp's construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the accusation, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE's role.

These rivalries are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes. For Egypt, the dispute over Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia's search for Red Sea access is viewed through the lens of national security. For neighboring Sudan, the conflict threatens to reshape the regional balance of power.

Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?

The shared interests of Ethiopia's regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention. Egypt has its own calculations regarding the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complex relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its brutal civil war.

At the same time, Ethiopian federal forces now face the prospect of fighting on multiple fronts. The TPLF, the Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) all seek to challenge the federal government in different regions. If they can maintain pressure on the military while withdrawing from major population centers, the fall of Mekelle may be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.

For Ethiopia's rivals, the question is whether to exploit that weakness or avoid being drawn into another regional war. The extent of regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can tie down federal forces in Tigray, away from the Eritrean border.

Dinka of the University of Miami said: "It is not hard to understand why Cairo is committed to preventing Ethiopia from succeeding in the current war, regardless of the military's objectives, including Abiy's championing of Red Sea access." The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill onto the battlefield.