Baltic States Need De-escalation Mechanism; Belarus Could Act as Mediator

In recent weeks, military tensions in the Baltic region have escalated significantly. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – all NATO members – have repeatedly reported airspace violations by Ukrainian drones. According to Kyiv and Baltic authorities, these drones, en route to strike targets in western Russia, were jammed electronically by Russia and strayed into the three countries' territory.

Early in May, several stray drones crashed in Latvia, one damaging an oil depot. The incident sparked a political crisis and brought down the Latvian government. Last week, a drone was shot down over Estonian territory, and another drone sighting forced Lithuania to halt rail and air traffic.

Shortly afterward, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and its envoy to the UN issued threatening warnings, accusing the Baltic states of providing a corridor for Ukrainian drones to strike Russian infrastructure and even allowing Ukrainian drone operators to operate on their soil.

The escalation increases the risk of miscalculation. Hence, the Baltic states urgently need de-escalation mechanisms and communication channels.

New Risk of Escalation in Eastern Europe

The string of drone incidents and direct military warnings from Russia highlight two dangerous trends. First, the horizontal escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war – long feared – has occurred. For the first time in decades, air raid sirens have sounded in NATO member states. While Moscow and Baltic/Nordic NATO capitals have not yet engaged in direct confrontation, that prospect becomes more likely if tensions do not cool in the coming weeks. Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginiene noted: "The war is closer than ever."

The Baltic region has long been considered the most potential flashpoint between Russia and NATO. The three Baltic states lie between mainland Russia to the east and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave to the west; Latvia and Lithuania also border Belarus, a Russian ally.

Second, this is not a temporary outbreak of instability but the new normal of Eastern European security, revealing complex geopolitical contradictions. Neither side can unilaterally control the action-reaction spiral, leading to risks of miscalculation and intentional or accidental escalation.

Under these circumstances, the parties appear to be adopting ever more hawkish stances, reinforcing deterrence, including by nuclear weapons. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys stated that NATO must "show the Russians that we can pierce their little fortress in Kaliningrad," and that the alliance has "enough means to level Russian air defense and missile bases there." Meanwhile, Moscow continues to threaten retaliation against decision-making centers in the Baltic states.

Analysts note that this tough approach may be domestically and alliance-safe, but it does not reduce escalation risk. Focusing only on deterrence and inflexible positions will only worsen the situation.

Toward a Sub-Regional Security Mechanism

To avoid sliding into a major war, the Baltic and Eastern European states urgently need a sub-regional mechanism to reduce military risks and maintain a de-escalation communication channel with Moscow. This mechanism must be fully depoliticized and run by military personnel, not politicians.

A formal security agreement between NATO and Russia is currently unfeasible. Therefore, a de facto military coordination mechanism could be established between five countries on both sides of the dividing line: on the NATO side – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland; on the other side – Belarus, Russia's military ally.

This mechanism does not require a political or legal agreement, only a shared understanding to avoid escalation scenarios driven by misinformation and misunderstandings. In form, this framework could rely on a network of bilateral confidence-building and security agreements that Belarus signed with all three Baltic states and Poland over 20 years ago. Although the NATO states bordering Belarus suspended implementation of these agreements in late 2020, none has withdrawn from them, and they could easily be revived.

These agreements originated in a different technological age, prior to drones and modern challenges, but they can still serve as a general framework to legitimize and facilitate regular military contacts to address the drone threat.

Initial steps have already been noted: recently, Belarus's military used the corresponding communication channels to inform Polish and Baltic colleagues about stray drones. Polish and Baltic officials acknowledged this information sharing was useful in practice. Now, they can begin sharing similar information with Belarus.

This mechanism will not resolve the fundamental disagreements between the parties, but it is essential to reduce escalation risks when any incident could drag the entire region into war.