Iran appoints six military commanders in wartime security shake-up

Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has appointed six senior commanders across the General Staff, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij internal security force. Analysts say the move is designed to equip the country’s wartime security apparatus with battle-hardened figures.

Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi was confirmed as overall IRGC commander with the rank of major general from Monday, formally succeeding Mohammad Pakpour, who was killed in a US–Israeli attack on Iran in late February. Senior army officer Mostafa Izadi was named as his deputy.

Major General Ali Abdollahi takes over as chief of staff of the armed forces, with Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari as his deputy. Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy, while Hossein Taeb will lead the Basij – the paramilitary internal security force that reports directly to the supreme leader.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the six commanders had shown their experience in “two recent imposed wars” in a post on his Telegram channel.

The appointments come a day after former IRGC commander-in-chief Mohsen Rezaei was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Khamenei’s representative to the top decision-making body, which plays a key role in Iran’s security and foreign policy.

Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the International Crisis Group, said the appointments were “not just about consolidating Mojtaba Khamenei’s power but also addressing weaknesses exposed by two wars.”

Iran’s supreme leader “is placing trusted veterans in key positions while reshaping the command structure for faster, more cohesive responses to the next crisis,” Vaez told Al Jazeera.

Vahidi tasked with ‘offensive operations’

Khamenei instructed Vahidi – who has led the IRGC since March and was formally confirmed on Monday – to enhance deterrence and readiness for “offensive operations,” signaling a more assertive military posture.

Top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Vahidi had led the IRGC during the recent war and that the force should continue to follow “the guidance of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei,” according to state media.

Vaez said Vahidi has extensive experience in the IRGC’s strategic, intelligence and asymmetric warfare apparatus. “Promoting him shows Tehran is prioritizing survival and deterrence by ensuring that next time it is attacked, it can respond faster, harder and more cohesively.”

Muhanad Seloom, assistant professor of security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, said the appointments are drawn almost entirely from the IRGC’s founding generation – of which Vahidi is emblematic.

Vahidi joined the IRGC in its early days in the late 1970s, rising through the ranks during the 1980s and holding key intelligence and military positions. State media said he led the elite Quds Force from 1988 to 1997. The Quds Force is the IRGC’s overseas special operations arm.

He handed command of Quds to Qassem Soleimani in 1998, who remained in the role until he was killed in a US drone strike in Baghdad in 2020. Vahidi now takes on the task of leading Iran’s military in a full-scale war.

Seloom said the new commander-in-chief earned his position through proven loyalty to the supreme leader and a solid record in intelligence and internal security. “This is not generational renewal but reinforcement of a trusted veteran cadre, prioritizing regime cohesion over military innovation.”

Sina Toossi, non-resident senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for International Policy, said the language surrounding Vahidi’s appointment “is particularly notable.” “Khamenei calls for ‘maximum deterrence’ but also explicitly directs the IRGC to maintain readiness for ‘offensive operations against the enemy.’ Iranian commentary has stressed this as an unusually explicit articulation of offensive operations as part of the IRGC’s mission,” Toossi wrote on X.

This suggests a redefinition of deterrence, “increasingly focused not just on retaliation but on a demonstrated ability to take initiative and inflict damage.”

Preparing for a long confrontation?

Toossi said the appointments seem to be “an effort to institutionalize the lessons of the war and prepare Iran for a protracted confrontation, rather than moving away from wartime posture.”

In doing so, Iran’s supreme leader – who succeeded his assassinated father, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in March – “is beginning to build his own architecture for Iran’s wartime state.” “Diplomacy remains part of the strategy, but these appointments suggest it is pursued in expectation of continued conflict, not because Tehran believes the war is truly over.”

The appointment of Rezaei as Iran’s security chief also signals a change in the domestic balance of power. According to Seloom, Rezaei was appointed by Khamenei to replace former security chief Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr – who was close to Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Ghalibaf.

Rezaei may lead the next phase of negotiations with the US, tipping “the civil-military balance toward the resistance faction and disciplining the negotiating line around the supreme leader.” “The real change is political: who controls strategy, rather than what the strategy is.”

The analyst warned that while Iran is adopting a more offensive posture, this does not necessarily translate into greater military action. “Vahidi is tasked with maximum deterrence and readiness for offensive operations, but this is largely declaratory, designed to create bargaining leverage. Where real offensive options exist, they are asymmetric.”

“I call Iran’s posture rhetorically offensive, attritional by design,” he added. “And until Tehran fixes its counterintelligence problem, offensive ambitions remain constrained by intelligence weaknesses.”