Israel's Election Watched Closely Across Africa

As Israelis prepare to vote on October 27, African governments from Pretoria to Rabat are weighing how the election outcome could shape their own foreign and domestic policies.

The war in Gaza has laid bare deep divisions across the continent, with some governments pursuing diplomatic measures against Israel while others maintain trade and security ties.

Recent polls point to a tight race between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party and its far-right alliance and a bloc of opposition parties led by a Jewish leader. Neither side is forecast to win the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset, and a lengthy coalition negotiation period is expected after the vote.

How the next government approaches Gaza and the Palestinian question could affect Israel's efforts to maintain and expand partnerships across the continent. Israel's relations in Africa are shaped by competing priorities. While the Gaza war has increased diplomatic pressure and public opposition in many countries, security needs, commercial interests and long-standing bilateral ties continue to drive government decisions.

Diplomatic pressure and the pull of rapprochement

Since the war began in October 2023, South Africa has emerged as one of Israel's harshest critics in Africa. Its government filed a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention. Israel rejects the allegations. The interim measures the court issued in 2024, including an order for Israel to act to prevent genocidal acts, are not a final ruling on whether genocide occurred.

In November 2023, South Africa's parliament passed a resolution calling on the government to close Israel's embassy and suspend diplomatic relations. The resolution does not itself implement those measures, but it illustrates the strength of political opposition to Israel's military campaign.

Other African governments have taken differing approaches, reflecting national political priorities and foreign policy calculations rather than a single continental stance. Chad recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, while several countries have maintained ties despite criticizing Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

Morocco is a contrasting case. It restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-brokered deal tied to Washington's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Despite protests against normalization, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties.

On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral summit chaired by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries reaffirmed plans to upgrade diplomatic relations, raising their respective missions to embassy status and appointing ambassadors.

They also agreed to sign investment protection and double taxation avoidance agreements before the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan carriers, and arrange reciprocal high-level visits in the coming months. These are announced commitments, not confirmation that the changes have been implemented.

According to Idowu Johnson, an associate professor of international relations at the University of Ibadan, Africa's diversity makes a uniform response to Israel's election hard to predict.

"Africa's diversity means countries handle relations with Israel individually. Since the attacks of October 7, 2023, African criticism has focused on Israel's denial of a Palestinian state.

The October 27 election will therefore be pivotal, because a new government's stance on the Palestinian issue will shape the extent of African cooperation in agriculture, trade, security and technology, based on self-determination and international law as well as bilateral interests," Johnson said.

Israel's relations with the African Union (AU) also reflect these divisions. In 2021, the chairperson of the AU Commission accredited Israel's representative to the body, drawing objections from member states.

In February 2022, the AU Assembly established a committee of heads of state and government to consult on Israel's observer status. The dispute continued into 2023, when the AU moved to suspend Israel's accreditation pending further review.

The disagreement reflects broader splits over Israel's treatment of Palestinians and the organization's approach to the conflict. A new Israeli government could seek to ease tensions, but any change would depend on that government's policies as well as the positions of AU member states.

Security ties may outlast diplomatic tensions

Security cooperation is an important part of Israel's relations with several African governments. Israeli companies have pursued defense and security contracts involving equipment, surveillance technology and training.

However, the nature and scale of these relationships vary by country, and claims about specific deals or technologies should be tied to documented cases rather than treated as evidence of a uniform Israeli security presence across the continent.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a recent example of efforts to deepen cooperation. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi visited Israel from August 31 to September 1, meeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions covered security, defense, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology. Both sides expressed a desire to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand cooperation in multiple areas.

The visit followed memorandums of understanding signed on July 27. Congolese officials said the visit would review those agreements and seek further Israeli investment, including opportunities linked to the Lobito Corridor. The meetings showed the potential scope of bilateral cooperation, but did not confirm that a specific new security contract had been signed.

For governments grappling with armed groups, insecurity can create incentives to seek equipment, intelligence and training from foreign partners. Still, the importance of Israeli cooperation varies between countries, and diplomatic tensions will not necessarily have the same effect on every security relationship.

The limits of Israel's diplomatic outreach were also on display after it recognized Somaliland as an independent state on December 26 last year, becoming the first country to do so. Somalia and other critics rejected the move, saying it undermines Somalia's territorial integrity. The decision sparked protests in Somalia and Somaliland.

In comments to Al Jazeera this month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia would not accept an Israeli presence in the country "under any circumstances." He added that Israel is planning to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city's airport, and argued that Israel's real aim is to draw closer to Gulf states and Iran.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), 110 protests directly related to Israel's recognition of Somaliland had been recorded as of its February 2026 Africa overview. Only seven supported the move, all in Somaliland; the rest opposed it. These figures cover protests linked to that specific decision, not all African views on Israel, and should not be treated as a measure of public opinion across the continent.

Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, argues that public opposition can constrain governments even when they see strategic value in maintaining ties.

"The strongest constraint, however, may come from African publics rather than governments: the recognition of Somaliland met with widespread opposition, the African Union and many governments reaffirmed Somalia's territorial integrity, and ACLED recorded 110 related protests, only seven in support.

Depending on its approach, a successor Israeli government could therefore either deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if it continues policies seen as tied to the war in Gaza, widening the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment," Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

The Somaliland case shows how a diplomatic move can provoke backlash when it is seen as challenging a core principle of sovereignty. That alone does not prove African governments will abandon security deals with Israel. The consequences will depend on the countries involved, the terms of cooperation and the domestic political cost of maintaining them.

Trade, agricultural technology and the contest for influence

Trade and development cooperation offer Israel another route to sustaining relations in Africa. Israeli companies and officials have pursued partnerships in sectors including agriculture, irrigation, water management, health and technology.

Such cooperation can bring practical benefits to governments seeking investment and technical expertise, but trade ties do not necessarily translate into public support for Israeli policy.

Zambia illustrates Israel's efforts to deepen bilateral relations. Israel opened a resident embassy in Lusaka in August last year, after 52 years without one. Agriculture, water management, health, education and technology were identified as potential areas for closer cooperation. The move was part of a broader Israeli push to strengthen engagement with African states.

Some analysts interpret Israel's renewed engagement with Zambia as an effort to cultivate partners that can counterbalance South Africa's regional influence. That remains an interpretation, not an established explanation for the relationship.

Zambia has its own reasons to seek investment and cooperation, particularly in agriculture, water management and technology; closer bilateral ties do not by themselves prove that countering South Africa is Israel's objective.

Professor Iwebunor Okwechime of Obafemi Awolowo University points to the historical roots of South Africa's stance toward Israel.

"If we trace the position South Africa has taken, it stems from the apartheid era, when Israel supported the apartheid regime and refused to support the struggle against minority rule. This historical context matters for understanding South Africa-Israel relations today," Okwechime told Al Jazeera.

For African governments, the challenge will be balancing security and trade interests with public opposition, commitments to Palestinian rights and positions on international law. For Israel, the coming election will test whether a new government can ease diplomatic tensions across Africa without fundamentally changing the policies that sparked them.

As Okwechime told Al Jazeera: "There will be no radical change in sentiment regardless of which government takes power."