AU Mission to Sudan: Ceasefire Push Amid Deepening War

The African Union (AU) began a two-day field visit to Sudan on Sunday, aiming to advance ceasefire efforts, improve humanitarian access, and restore a political process to end a war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions over three years.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is working with Sudan's authorities and other conflict parties, focusing on aid access and prospects for a political settlement. Earlier this year, the PSC decided to undertake this mission to contribute to long-term peace and stability.

The delegation arrives at a sensitive moment in the war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have regained control of most of the capital Khartoum, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remain entrenched in large parts of Darfur in western Sudan. Kordofan, the region connecting the country's center, west, and south, has become another major battlefield.

SAF's gains around the capital have changed the military landscape, but no side has achieved a decisive victory. This leaves the AU to push diplomacy while both forces still believe they can improve their positions on the ground.

What does the AU hope to achieve?

The PSC's priorities are intertwined: push SAF and RSF toward a ceasefire, improve humanitarian access, and protect a political process that can define Sudan's future beyond the two armed groups.

The AU has repeatedly called for a comprehensive, Sudanese-led political process, stressing that a halt in fighting alone will not resolve a crisis that predates the war.

Sudan's transition after the ouster of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019 collapsed amid disagreements between civilian and military factions. In October 2021, the military dissolved the civilian-military power-sharing agreement, deepening tensions over the country's future. The war began in April 2023 after months of confrontation between SAF and RSF over plans to transition to civilian rule.

The AU faces a two-pronged challenge: reduce fighting enough to allow humanitarian aid and negotiations, while ensuring any agreement goes beyond a simple power- and territory-sharing arrangement between the two armed factions.

Where do battles currently stand?

SAF's recapture of most of Khartoum has solidified the army's position in central Sudan. But the RSF's loss of the capital does not spell complete defeat. The RSF remains a formidable military force with control over much of Darfur and the ability to continue fighting elsewhere.

Kordofan has become particularly significant due to its location between areas held by each side and the strategic routes linking them. Fighting around el-Obeid shows the war continues despite the army's victories near Khartoum.

Control of Kordofan could affect supply lines connecting SAF-held areas with western Sudan, as well as the RSF's ability to move troops and equipment between Darfur and other regions.

That battlefield reality is central to the diplomatic challenge. If one side believes it is close to victory, it has little incentive to compromise. Yet neither side can decisively defeat the other.

Why have previous efforts failed?

The AU has been involved in Sudan diplomacy from the war's outset. In May 2023, the PSC adopted a roadmap calling for a permanent, comprehensive ceasefire, humanitarian access, protection of civilians, and a return to a credible political transition process.

SAF and RSF signed commitments in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in May 2023 regarding civilian protection, short-term ceasefires, and humanitarian agreements. But those commitments failed to end the fighting.

In October 2024, the PSC conducted another field visit to Cairo and Port Sudan, pressing for a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and a return to the political process.

Thus, the problem is not a lack of diplomatic initiatives. The difficulty lies in persuading the warring parties to make concessions when both still believe they can achieve more on the battlefield.

Broader mediation efforts also involve the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional bloc in East Africa, the United Nations, and the United States and Saudi Arabia through the Jeddah process. The AU has repeatedly called for closer coordination among these efforts.

African-led mediation has succeeded in other crises, but Sudan presents a far tougher challenge. Unlike the post-election crisis in Kenya, where AU-backed mediation helped produce a power-sharing deal after the disputed 2007 election, Sudan's conflict involves two powerful armed forces that control territory and still believe they can improve their positions through force.

Does the AU have enough leverage?

The PSC carries diplomatic weight, but that does not necessarily translate into enough pressure to force SAF and RSF to halt hostilities.

Dennis Amachree, a former deputy director of Nigeria's State Security Service (DSS), told Al Jazeera that the AU lacks the muscle to compel both sides to end the war. “Unfortunately, the AU does not have the power on its own to force the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to stop fighting.”

He argued that the AU lacks “enforcement mechanisms, financial wherewithal, and a standby military force” to pressure the main belligerents.

That leaves the AU reliant on diplomatic pressure and coordination with regional and international actors. The AU's challenge is to convert political prestige into enough leverage to make negotiation more appealing than a fresh offensive.

Will this visit break the deadlock?

Benjamin Dowmoh-Doyen of the African Content Production Chamber (ACCP) told Al Jazeera that the visit is a step toward an African-led solution.

“This AU visit is a step in the right direction. Africa must manage its own affairs, and an African-led, African-owned solution is the only path to a lasting resolution in Sudan,” he said.

But African ownership alone will not resolve the impasse. The AU needs SAF and RSF to accept that a political process can deliver what continued fighting cannot.

A two-day visit will not settle those questions. Its significance will depend on whether the AU secures commitments that survive after the delegation departs, and whether it creates enough space for negotiations to advance.

Kabir Amadu, a security analyst in Nigeria and founder of Beacon Consulting Limited, argued that Sudan's war has produced exhaustion rather than a solution, as both sides receive enough internal and external backing to keep fighting but not enough to secure a decisive win.

“The challenge for the AU delegation is to convert this battlefield stalemate into diplomatic momentum before it freezes into a permanent partition of Sudan,” he told Al Jazeera.