India-Bangladesh impasse over Hasina: What's the way out?

Dhaka, Bangladesh — The relationship between India and Bangladesh is facing a significant challenge after former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who has been in exile in India, delivered a video address on August 5, criticizing the uprising that ousted her.

The event unfolded as New Delhi and Dhaka were planning Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's first official visit to India, but those plans have now collapsed.

The 'megaphone' problem

Bangladesh's foreign ministry expressed 'outrage' that Hasina was permitted to make public statements from Indian territory. Dhaka had previously cautioned New Delhi against allowing political activities that could affect bilateral ties.

In response, the Bangladeshi government stated that a 'conducive environment' is required before Prime Minister Rahman visits India, and has reiterated requests for New Delhi to process the extradition of Hasina and other suspects. India says these requests are under consideration through appropriate procedures.

However, interviews with Bangladeshi officials and analysts reveal that the core issue goes beyond extradition.

Faisal Mahmud, a former press official at the Bangladeshi embassy in New Delhi, argues that two distinct matters must be separated: extradition and Hasina's political activities in India.

'The impasse between Bangladesh and India is primarily due to New Delhi giving Hasina a literal megaphone to use while she is in exile—something Dhaka specifically asked India not to allow,' Mahmud told Al Jazeera.

According to him, extradition is 'a completely different matter, far more complex and prolonged,' and the government of Prime Minister Rahman understands this well. The current deadlock is not about extraditing Hasina but about India letting her conduct political activities from its soil.

This concern predates the current government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In April 2025, during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Muhammad Yunus, then head of Bangladesh's interim government, requested that New Delhi prevent Hasina from making 'incendiary statements' from Indian territory.

Bangladesh's Deputy Foreign Minister Humaiun Kobir emphasized that Dhaka seeks 'a good and fruitful relationship with India based on mutual trust and respect,' but allowing Hasina to destabilize the country is unacceptable. He suggested that ties could enter a 'new phase' if New Delhi correctly acknowledges the new political reality in Bangladesh following the 2024 uprising.

Still, Kobir's remarks indicate Dhaka does not want the Hasina issue to permanently hinder high-level contacts. A meeting between the two prime ministers is inevitable. 'The meeting is a must,' he said, 'but only when it suits our national interests. It could be next week, two weeks, or two months from now.'

Last weekend, India's President's Office briefly posted a notice indicating preparations to welcome Prime Minister Rahman, but it was retracted just hours later.

Will India extradite Hasina?

Distinguishing the two issues is crucial because limiting Hasina's political activities and extraditing her present vastly different challenges for New Delhi.

Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia by Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity during the bloody crackdown on the 2024 uprising. She has rejected the verdict as politically motivated.

Bangladesh formally requested Hasina's extradition on December 23, 2024, under the 2013 extradition treaty between the two countries. After the death sentence was handed down in November 2025, Dhaka repeated its request. On August 11, India's foreign ministry said the request was under examination through standard procedures and would be communicated upon progress.

Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, a former Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh, said the case must be handled according to the treaty's provisions and Indian law. 'All legal processes must be completed to obtain a court order for extradition,' he said, also noting the treaty includes provisions that allow refusing extradition.

Domestic politics shaping diplomacy

Some analysts see contradictions in Dhaka's approach. David Bergman, a long-time observer of Bangladeshi politics, suggests that Dhaka demands extradition while knowing full well New Delhi will never comply, to 'perform for the domestic audience.' In reality, the Bangladeshi government may not want Hasina back, as managing a former prime minister under a death sentence would create countless sensitive legal and political complications.

The Hasina issue is only part of a larger effort by Dhaka to recalibrate its relationship with New Delhi. Professor Shahab Enam Khan of Jahangirnagar University says Dhaka's current stance should not be simplistically seen as anti-India. Bangladesh still needs India for trade, defense, security, and people-to-people ties. He explains that the government's policy reflects pressures from two sides: asserting legal sovereignty and responding to public sentiment, which holds that New Delhi was overly close to Hasina's Awami League for two decades.

Professor Khan notes that India invested heavily in the Awami League as its primary political partner in Bangladesh and was slow to adapt to the post-2024 political reality. New Delhi is now 'increasingly accepting the reality,' but Dhaka needs to see that shift translate into concrete outcomes.

No one wants a rupture

Despite tensions, practical cooperation persists. A delegation from the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry visited Dhaka earlier this month. Bilateral trade remains above $12 billion annually, with India exporting $10.56 billion to Bangladesh.

Former High Commissioner Chakravarty stressed that 'geography is an immutable geopolitical factor, binding India and Bangladesh in ways that cannot be ignored.' However, he criticized Dhaka for attaching conditions to Prime Minister Rahman's visit, arguing that national interests and bilateral ties should not be 'held hostage' by any individual.

Expert Sreeradha Datta of O P Jindal University points out that Bangladesh's efforts to diversify its relationships have not diminished India's strategic importance. Dhaka's growing cooperation with the US, China, Turkey, and Pakistan worries New Delhi, but 'neither side can stay apart for long.' The two countries share a 4,096-kilometer border and more than 70 bilateral cooperation mechanisms.

On August 18, India's foreign ministry stated that the invitation to Prime Minister Rahman remains valid, reiterating its desire to build a 'positive, constructive, and forward-looking' relationship with Bangladesh.

The big question remains open: what concessions, whether public or tacit, could create enough political space for both governments to meet without appearing to have backed down?