Saudi Arabia holds the key to a Palestinian state
Nawaf Obaid
Saudi Arabia's role in the Arab and Islamic world gives it significant weight in prospects for normalization with Israel. The kingdom has maintained a consistent stance for more than half a century, viewing recognition of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state as parallel components of a single solution. With its economic, religious and political standing, Saudi Arabia is seen as the decisive factor.
Nearly eight decades after Israel's founding, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state remains the central question of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Wars have been fought, peace treaties signed, and diplomatic initiatives launched, yet this key strategic issue remains unresolved.
Today, Saudi Arabia is at the forefront of efforts to establish a Palestinian state and deliver a lasting peace deal with Israel. The kingdom's commitment is evident in its decision to co-sponsor the birth of the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution in 2024, currently meeting in Rome.
King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are following in the footsteps of previous Saudi monarchs. For more than half a century, the kingdom has maintained a consistent stance. The question has never been whether peace with Israel is possible, but whether the necessary political conditions to make that peace comprehensive, legitimate and irreversible have been met.
Within that framework, recognition of Israel and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state are parallel components of a single solution. Neither is designed to precede the other.
That doctrine dates back to King Faisal, who made Palestinian self-determination a central pillar of Saudi national security policy. His successors have upheld this principle while adapting its diplomatic expression to changing regional realities. The goal has remained constant even as the diplomatic environment has evolved.
The 1981 Fahd Plan — named after King Fahd — translated that doctrine into a formal peace proposal calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and recognition of Palestinian national rights. Two decades later, then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah expanded the same strategic logic through the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Israel was offered comprehensive peace and normal relations with the Arab world in exchange for withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
Thus, the current Saudi leadership inherits an established strategic doctrine, not an unresolved policy debate. Their responsibility is to determine whether today's diplomatic environment can finally meet conditions that have remained unchanged for decades.
That continuity also reflects a broader question of state legitimacy. For the Saudi monarchy, support for the Palestinian state has never been merely a foreign policy issue. It has become one of the enduring pillars of the kingdom's political and religious legitimacy, rooted in the monarch's role as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and reinforced by the kingdom's longstanding position in both the Arab and Islamic worlds.
The significance of that continuity became more apparent after the 2020 Abraham Accords. By establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later joined by Morocco and Sudan, the accords demonstrated that Arab-Israeli normalization could proceed without progress on a Palestinian state. They reshaped regional diplomacy but did not resolve the Palestine question or complete the broader peace process.
Successive U.S. administrations have seen Saudi involvement as the decisive missing element. The Abraham Accords could expand without Riyadh, but they could not acquire full strategic meaning without the kingdom's participation.
The Trump administration has once again placed Saudi-Israeli normalization at the center of its regional diplomacy. But this diplomatic move must be assessed in the broader post-October 7 context.
The war in Gaza has created an entirely new diplomatic environment. The subsequent ceasefire initiative and the establishment of the Peace Council introduced a framework aimed at ending the conflict, stabilizing the territory, and beginning reconstruction. Their significance lies not in replacing a political solution, but in creating the conditions for such a solution to become viable.
Yet for the kingdom, the essential political requirement remains unchanged: the establishment of a genuinely sovereign and irreversible Palestinian state.
That stance rests on mutually reinforcing political, religious and economic foundations. The monarch rules not only as head of state but as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, a responsibility carrying religious authority across the Islamic world. Any decision related to recognizing Israel would therefore require both political approval and broad religious legitimacy. Such legitimacy cannot be credibly based on promises of future negotiations. It would require the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.
The kingdom's wider influence reinforces that stance. It is the largest economy in the Arab world, accounting for about a third of total Arab economic output. The kingdom is the only G20 member in the region, one of the world's leading energy superpowers, and the largest exporter of crude oil. It is also the main economic engine of the Middle East. Combined with its religious standing, these factors make Saudi decisions consequential far beyond bilateral diplomacy.
The consequences would extend well beyond the kingdom itself. Several major Arab countries, including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, have not recognized Israel. Their decisions are sovereign, but a Saudi-Israeli deal grounded in a Palestinian state would nevertheless change the political environment in which those decisions are made.
Lebanon illustrates the point. Washington is encouraging Beirut to move toward formal relations with Israel as part of broader efforts to stabilize the Israel-Lebanon border. However, the domestic political cost of such a decision would be fundamentally different after a Saudi-backed deal grounded in a Palestinian state than before.
The same logic extends across the wider Islamic world. Major Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Malaysia have refused to recognize Israel because the Palestine question remains unresolved. A deal endorsed by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and accompanied by the establishment of a Palestinian state would compel those governments to follow suit. It would remove the main political and religious obstacles to reconsidering their positions.
This is what ultimately distinguishes Saudi Arabia from the earlier Abraham Accords. Saudi involvement would be qualitatively different, not merely in scale, carrying political, economic and religious weight across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Whether the current diplomatic process can ultimately reach that point remains uncertain. Israel, Palestine, the United States, the European Union and several regional governments all have indispensable roles. Yet the ultimate Saudi decision rests with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Within the strategic framework they inherited, establishing a Palestinian state and recognizing Israel are not sequential steps but parallel obligations. Neither can achieve lasting legitimacy without the other.
