Who determines Iran’s fighting and negotiating position amid US threats?

Tehran, Iran – Negotiations to prevent a further outbreak of war between Iran and the United States are being held, but the stagnant process has highlighted who holds power within Iran’s government.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, a relative moderate, said on Monday that his government had been given “certain powers” by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei regarding the negotiations with the US.

Pezeshkian, who has come under fire from hardliners opposed to any deal with Washington, did not give any details about what authority this entails.

His comment followed efforts by mediators, including Qatar and Pakistan, to prevent new US strikes on Iran. There have been strong indications of an impending major escalation in the conflict, which began with US and Israeli air strikes on Iran on February 28, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top Iranian officials.

Since then, the balance of power in Iran has increasingly shifted towards the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other security-minded officials.

“I think the key point is that any agreement must have the backing of the security-military establishment in Iran,” Sina Toossi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera.

The political analyst added that this is especially true given that negotiations now concern not just the Iranian nuclear programme and sanctions but also the broader security arrangements emerging from the war, including control over the Strait of Hormuz and guarantees against renewed attacks.

Iran has put forward a seven-point plan it demands the US abide by to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian authorities said decision-making on the war and negotiations takes place through a concerted approach within the framework of the institutions of the government.

Those institutions include the office of the supreme leader and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Military and security figures and bodies are prominent in all of them.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s office said he met with top military commanders, including IRGC chief commander Ahmad Vahidi, to give them directives on how to handle US threats of all-out war.

Khamenei said Iran’s armed forces should respond immediately and without geographical restrictions against any threat and expand their list of US and Israeli targets in case the war escalates.

Ultimately, important decisions, such as ending the war, are decided by the supreme leader, but the SNSC – which includes representatives from the armed forces, ministers from the government, and the heads of parliament and the judiciary – votes on them first.

Who holds more sway now?

By law, Iran’s president is also the head of the SNSC, but the position of the secretary has recently held more weight due to his role as a central coordinator for top national security files.

That position has been occupied since early August by Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander-in-chief who has never held public office.

When US Vice President JD Vance wrote a letter to Tehran last week, he addressed it to Rezaei, not the president or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker, who has also acted as its chief negotiator in recent months.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Rezaei, not Ghalibaf, would respond to the letter if he chooses. But he also pointed out that Ghalibaf had not been removed from the position of chief negotiator.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his deputies, including Kazem Gharibabadi, also remain among the main government figures for maintaining contact with mediators and pursuing diplomacy through the United Nations and international bodies.

Ghalibaf had steered talks that led to the signing in June of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Washington, which briefly paused the war and lifted a maritime blockade imposed against southern Iranian ports by the US military.

But it fell apart after Tehran accused the US of violating several provisions of the deal, including on the Strait of Hormuz, and the IRGC launched attacks against three vessels attempting “unauthoritsed” transits.

The US military then escalated its own strikes on Iran, reimposed the blockade and introduced new sanctions on Iran. A larger number of ships in the Strait of Hormuz were then hit by explosions, and Iran’s military was believed to be behind the attacks.

The MoU’s downfall prompted discussions about the power dynamics within Iran’s government. For months, local and international media and analysts speculated about who ordered the attacks and what their implications were. Some US media quoted sources as saying hardline factions within the establishment directed the attacks on shipping.

In early August, Pezeshkian said he would have preferred the MoU had continued, adding, “A team should have been formed to address violations rather than to fight.”

In mid-October, IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said hitting the three ships was no rogue action and there was coordination with unspecified higher authorities.

“It is not possible for someone to ignore military hierarchy and take action of their own accord on an important issue like war between two or several countries. This is by no means possible,” he said.

Mohebbi characterised the attacks as a “decisive response” to the violations by the US, which had previously launched attacks during negotiations.

He accused Washington of violating the MoU by establishing an alternative shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz near Oman and taking other steps.

“It appears that noncommitment and violation of treaties exist as an unwritten doctrine among the governing body of the US,” Mohebbi said.

Official conditions for a deal

In the current mediated talks with the US, some of Iran’s demands amount to a return to the MoU along with better sequencing and some additions to guarantee a potential future deal would last longer.

Rezaei told state television he detected a positive change in tone in the message sent by Vance, but Iran’s security chief has so far left it unanswered because Iran’s primary conditions have been clearly communicated through mediators.

Tehran seeks an end to the US naval blockade, lifting of oil and other sanctions, release of its funds frozen abroad, reduction in the US military deployment in Iran’s periphery and a halt to fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon.

In the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian authorities have been united in saying they want to enforce sovereignty and expect Washington to recognise an Iran-Oman deal that establishes shipping routes for a partial reopening.

Decision-makers in Tehran have insisted those preliminary conditions must be fulfilled before negotiations move to a next phase that would also deal with Iran’s nuclear programme.

In a statement on Tuesday, Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of the armed forces, said “Iran’s roadmap for sustainable security” includes relying on “security measures from within West Asia” as well as guarantees of nonaggression.

Political analyst Toossi said he wouldn’t necessarily interpret the different roles of Rezaei, Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian as evidence of competing centres of power.

“Rather they seem to reflect a division of responsibilities within a centrally coordinated process under Khamenei,” he said.

Iran’s leaders appear determined not to repeat the perceived mistakes of previous negotiations with US President Donald Trump’s administration when it made concessions or relied on US assurances only to face renewed pressure and military attacks.

“Tehran now wants Washington to fulfil its commitments before making concessions of its own, including on arrangements that would formalise Iran’s role in managing the Strait of Hormuz,” Toossi said. “This presents a formidable obstacle, even as both sides have compelling reasons to avoid another war.”

He said the fact that Iran has offered to shorten the timeline for reopening the strait to two days shows a tactical concession although it does not resolve larger issues.

“The real sticking point is not how quickly Hormuz reopens; it’s who controls the terms under which it stays open. Unless the two sides can bridge that fundamental disagreement, shortening the reopening timeline alone is unlikely to produce a breakthrough,” Toossi said.