Why Iran-US negotiations keep failing

Since the war erupted, there have been numerous negotiating initiatives between the United States and Iran. Only one was signed — the memorandum of understanding in Islamabad on June 18 — and it collapsed within days.

In most analysis, this failure is explained by the specific details of the terms. But another approach holds that the diplomatic deadlock between the two sides stems from a "syndrome" that has dominated US-Iran relations for years.

In international relations, psychological syndromes can form out of deep crises, leaving marks on political consciousness and memory that then obstruct efforts at rapprochement and negotiation between states.

For Iran and the US, this syndrome consists of two "complexes": Washington's, formed by the 1979 siege of the US embassy in Tehran, and Tehran's, formed by the history of American hostility and Washington's withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018.

The roots of the rupture

The origin of the rift between the two countries dates to August 1953, when US and British intelligence helped overthrow the nationalist government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh after he nationalized the oil industry in 1951. Since then, the conviction has sunk deep into Iranian consciousness that Washington will not accept an independent government in Tehran and is prepared to sabotage one that acts against American interests.

From this perspective, Washington's decision to admit Shah Reza Pahlavi — just overthrown by the people — for medical treatment in October 1979 was seen by revolutionary Tehran as the prelude to a second coup.

On November 4 that year, Iranian students stormed the US embassy and held 52 Americans for 444 days. Diplomatic relations were severed and have not been restored.

While Iran describes the event as an act of protecting the revolution, in the American consciousness it shaped the image of Iran as a country that disregards international norms, cannot be trusted to keep its word and should not be rewarded.

That is the embassy siege syndrome. The problem lies not in the event itself but in the implicit principle it created in US decision-making: Iran must concede first, and that concession must be verified before Iran receives anything in return.

Iran's syndrome

Iran's complex is also shaped by this history, but it peaked in May 2018 when US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), despite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirming that Tehran was complying with the deal.

Just two weeks later, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced 12 demands for a new agreement, only four of which concerned the nuclear file. Seven concerned Iran's regional conduct in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Gulf. In other words, Washington not only revoked an existing agreement but raised the bar for any future one.

The knot tightened further in June 2025 when the US joined the Twelve-Day War and struck nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, precisely when a new round of indirect talks was due to be held in Muscat. The culmination was Washington joining Israel in the current war.

Since then, the belief has sunk deep into Iranian consciousness that America's signature guarantees nothing, that any agreement can be reversed when administrations change, and that negotiations themselves may be a cover for war rather than an alternative to it.

The implicit principle this created in Iran's decision-making is: take no step before there are binding guarantees, and make no concession before pressure is lifted.

The two complexes thus stand at opposite ends: the first demands that Iran act before the US responds in kind, while the second demands that the US guarantee before Iran acts.

Imprints on negotiating initiatives

A review of recent negotiating initiatives shows that every American proposal bears the mark of the embassy siege syndrome. The 15-point plan put forward in March required the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow facilities; an end to uranium enrichment; suspension of Iran's missile program; and abandonment of its allies — in exchange for a promise of sanctions relief later.

The May draft by White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner tied the release of Iran's frozen funds to a suspension of enrichment first. The US response in September also stipulated a freeze on enrichment and admission of inspectors throughout the talks.

The constant in the American initiatives is that Iranian action must precede commensurate response, and verification must precede trust.

The imprint of the JCPOA withdrawal syndrome in Iran's initiatives is equally a constant. The five-point response in late March demanded guarantees that war would not recur. The 10-point version in April required a binding UN Security Council resolution protecting any agreement from reversal. The 14-point version in May required a non-aggression commitment, including toward Israel.

Meanwhile, the seven-day plan Tehran proposed last month stipulated the lifting of US sanctions and the naval blockade on Iran before the Strait of Hormuz would open on the sixth day and nuclear talks would begin on the seventh. The constant in Iran's initiatives is that guarantees must precede action, and the lifting of pressure must precede Iranian concessions.

All these initiatives are a dialogue between two complexes, with each side drafting its own text to protect itself against a repeat of its historical experience with the other rather than to meet in the middle. This may explain why the gap on substance has narrowed while the gap on trust has not.

The Islamabad memorandum: the exception that proves the rule

The Islamabad memorandum of understanding is the exception that proves the rule, because it came the closest to a solution by being drafted to reassure both sides on their core concerns.

To reassure Washington, the text provided for diluting Iran's enriched uranium stockpile while making sanctions relief and the release of frozen funds conditional on Iranian implementation. To reassure Tehran, it provided for an end to the conflict, mutual respect for sovereignty, an enforcement monitoring mechanism and UN Security Council endorsement of a final agreement. Ballistic missiles did not appear in the text at all.

Yet the deal did not hold. Tehran suspended its participation in the Geneva round over the absence of a ceasefire in Lebanon — a demand consistent across all Iranian initiatives since March. In Iran's reading, Washington's inability to restrain Israel confirmed that America's signature was not enough. The JCPOA withdrawal syndrome immediately resurfaced, and the two sides returned to the starting line.

By late September, the dispute appeared to have shifted entirely from substance to sequencing. Sources close to the talks said it now revolved around the order of steps rather than their content, and the stated aim had become a return to an upgraded version of the June memorandum.

Here the two complexes are clearest: Washington wants the Strait of Hormuz opened and enrichment frozen first because it does not trust Iran, while Tehran wants the naval blockade lifted first because it does not trust the US.

The gap narrows, but deadlock remains structural

A comparison between Pompeo's 2018 conditions and the June 2026 memorandum shows that US demands have retreated from reshaping Iran's regional role to focusing on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran's demands have shifted from reparations paid by Washington to a conditional investment fund financed by other parties.

In other words, the substantive gap between the two sides has narrowed considerably — something hard to imagine eight years ago.

Yet the two complexes have not diminished; they may even have deepened because of the war. Each feeds the other, to the point that together they have become a single syndrome, and the diplomatic deadlock has turned from a temporary condition into a stable structure.

As a result, any new formula on sequencing, however precise, will still fail to break this deadlock unless it addresses both complexes at once — which requires a third party capable of guaranteeing both action and commensurate response simultaneously.

The views in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.