Russia faces mounting pressure on battlefield and in its 'near abroad'

The annual Victory Day parade on Moscow's Red Square has always served a dual purpose: to remind Russians and audiences across the former Soviet Union of a glorious past. The display of military might on May 9 each year is seen as a barometer of Russia's geopolitical fortunes.

Last year, on the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazism, President Vladimir Putin was flanked by international leaders from around the world: China's Xi Jinping, Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Slovakia's Robert Fico, Serbia's Aleksandar Vucic, Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro, Egypt's Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority.

This year, the guest list shrank dramatically. Only leaders from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Laos, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan attended – along with representatives from Republika Srpska, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – but no major powers such as India or China were present.

The narrative of Russia as a pillar of a new multipolar world order now rings hollow, not only because this year's parade featured no heavy equipment due to fears of Ukrainian drone attacks. Above all, U.S. President Donald Trump has declared himself the architect of a three-day ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv.

On paper, things seem to be holding. Trump has not fully abandoned the idea of reaching a deal to freeze the war in Ukraine, even at the cost of major concessions from Kyiv. The current U.S. national security strategy calls for 'strategic stability' with Russia while criticizing Europe's 'woke' policies.

The protracted war with Iran has exposed the limits of U.S. military power. Rising oil prices have filled Russia's coffers and improved its fiscal balance. Trump has also lifted sanctions on some Russian oil to boost global supply. Meanwhile, Europe has signaled a willingness to negotiate with Moscow.

In reality, the atmosphere is gloomy. Russia's war effort in Ukraine remains stalled, regardless of how much money, materiel, and lives the Kremlin pours into the 'meat grinder' of what it calls the special military operation. Ukrainian drones have struck deep inside Russian territory, and even Red Square seems vulnerable to air attacks.

Trump has lost interest in courting Putin. With Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban losing power, the European Union has closed ranks. Inside Russia, economic growth has slowed from 4% in 2024 to a forecast of just over 1% this year.

The prospects for long-term development, productivity growth, and technological innovation are bleak. There are signs of discontent among the Russian elite. Even Putin's sky-high approval ratings have dipped slightly, according to pollsters.

The tightening of mobile internet in Moscow and other major cities has caused frustration. Russians may wonder how the special military operation – sold to the public as a glorious reprise of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 – has dragged on with no end in sight. It is no surprise that Putin felt compelled to declare that the 'problem' is nearing its end.

While concentrating resources on Ukraine, Russia is losing its initiative in what it calls the 'near abroad.' Last week showed Europe gaining ground in the region.

On Monday, Armenia hosted the annual summit of the European Political Community (EPC), bringing together European leaders. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also attended. Once a loyal Moscow ally and member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union, Yerevan is now deepening ties with the West.

After the EPC came the first EU-Armenia summit. This high-level meeting was a clear signal that Yerevan sees its future in the EU. Strategically, it is considering joining the group of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

The EU responded: The summit discussed investments of up to 2.5 billion euros ($2.95 billion) in Armenia; cooperation in energy, transport, and digital infrastructure; and visa liberalization.

Meanwhile, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are courting the Trump administration. The two countries have welcomed the U.S. as a mediator as they move closer to normalizing relations. In August at the White House, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint statement committing to peace.

In February, JD Vance became the first sitting U.S. vice president to visit Yerevan and later Baku. Armenians and Azerbaijanis are negotiating the opening of the Zangezur corridor, running between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave. The project has a name: the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.'

In short, the U.S. has scored points in Russia's backyard with the help of Pashinyan and Aliyev. Moscow is watching from the sidelines as a former satellite drifts out of its orbit. The EU and Turkey will benefit from Armenia's opening and connections with neighbors that align with their integration agendas.

Of course, this does not mean Armenia can simply jump from Russia to the West. Moscow still holds interests in Armenia's economy and thus has political leverage.

That will be on display in the June general election, where Pashinyan's Civil Contract party will face the Armenia Alliance of former President Robert Kocharyan and the Strong Armenia party linked to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. Both Kocharyan and Karapetyan have close ties to Moscow.

Public opinion favors diversifying relations but not cutting them off completely. That is a pragmatic stance that Pashinyan shares, despite his focus on strengthening ties with the West.

Russia has failed – or been unwilling – to support Armenia against Azerbaijan and to prevent the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenians have reason to seek alliances elsewhere. But without a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and full normalization with Turkey, they must be cautious and not burn bridges.

Armenia's leadership must also consider its neighbor Iran, with which it has good relations. An escalation of the U.S.-Israel war with Iran could threaten cross-border energy trade.

Putin would have liked to see Armenia and Azerbaijan at Saturday's parade. Likewise Moldova, where pro-EU forces won the 2025 parliamentary election. Or Georgia, which still has no diplomatic relations with Russia despite the rule of the autocratic-leaning Georgian Dream party, a party viewed positively by the Kremlin.

The chances of these countries attending next year are also slim. Even Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan likely will not confirm until the last minute, as they have for years.

Today, Russia's 'near abroad' is much farther away than before.