Peace in Lebanon More Elusive Than Military Victory

Amid a fragile ceasefire in Lebanon, President Joseph Aoun is preparing for what some call a “historic” visit to Washington. Analysts say US President Donald Trump may pressure Aoun to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. If the summit takes place, it would be the first meeting between the two countries' leaders in history.

But a symbolic meeting won't resolve the conflict in Lebanon, which has deep historical roots and broad geopolitical scope.

Despite the ceasefire, Israel continues to occupy areas of southern Lebanon. The goal of the ongoing campaign, according to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, is to establish a “security zone” across the entire area south of the Litani River—10% of Lebanon's national territory.

Residents are still forbidden from returning home as Israeli forces continue bombings and mass destruction. Netanyahu seems to be using the narrative of “destroying Hezbollah” to mask a campaign of widespread destruction and population displacement.

It should be noted that occupying the land south of the Litani River is not merely an Israeli military objective. It is a historical aspiration.

In 1918, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Israel's second and longest-serving president, together with David Ben-Gurion, the country's first prime minister, published a book titled The Land of Israel, in which the two authors described “our country” stretching from the Litani River to the Gulf of Aqaba.

In 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, the official meeting of the victorious Allied powers to set the terms of peace after World War I, a delegation from the World Zionist Organization led by Chaim Weizmann presented a memorandum calling for a Jewish state extending to the Litani River, as well as to Sinai and other territories beyond Israel's current borders.

During the 1948 war, the newly founded state of Israel set its sights on southern Lebanon, the country with the smallest army in the region. In October of that year, the Israeli army conquered the village of Hula without any resistance. More than 80 unarmed villagers were killed. The main perpetrator of that massacre, Shmuel Lahis, was sentenced to only one year in prison and, after a presidential pardon in 1955, became director-general of the Jewish Agency.

Many villages, such as Qadas and Saliha, along the Lebanon-Israel border, saw similar massacres and expulsions. Meanwhile, due to the catastrophe Palestinians call the Nakba, 100,000 Palestinian refugees were forced to move into Lebanon. The current demographics of southern Lebanon must be viewed in light of these dynamics and scars.

Decades of conflict have also shaped southern Lebanon. Suffice it to note that in the 1960s, many Shia areas in the south lacked running water, electricity, and access to secular schools, as the Lebanese government invested only 0.7% of public expenditure in the region. This neglect would become the basis for the politicization and mobilization of the Shia population in the following decades.

The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 was fundamentally driven by the convergence of deep internal divisions and the destabilizing presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which operated as a “state within a state” and launched cross-border attacks into Israel.

In March 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani, a major invasion of southern Lebanon aimed at crippling PLO bases and establishing a buffer zone, leading to significant civilian displacement and the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

Some members of the Shia community welcomed Israel's expulsion of the PLO from the south. But when the Israeli army invaded again in 1982, it was clear it had no intention of leaving. This accelerated the political mobilization of Lebanese Shia—Hezbollah being one of the main consequences.

In the decades that followed, Hezbollah became one of Israel's primary security concerns. The group used southern Lebanon to launch rockets and missiles into northern Israel and engaged in attacks against Israelis elsewhere.

Hezbollah also developed close ties with Israel's arch-enemy after 1979: the Islamic Republic of Iran. This relationship evolved from ideological dependency into a critical strategic partnership.

While the Iranian regime initially saw Hezbollah as a key element in exporting its revolution, it now views Hezbollah as its most effective regional asset and first line of defense against Israel's expansionist goals and policies in the region. Tehran has transferred military technology to its Lebanese ally, supplying advanced missiles, drones, and cyber warfare capabilities.

While it is true that Hezbollah has posed a threat to Israel, the disparity in firepower cannot be ignored. From 2007 to 2022, Air Pressure recorded 22,355 illegal violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli forces. Regarding the period from October 7, 2023 onward, Channel 4 reported that Israeli attacks on Lebanon were five times more frequent than Hezbollah’s. In the year since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded nearly 7,800 airspace violations by Israeli forces.

For Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel, the ongoing war has become an existential conflict. For the Lebanese government, Hezbollah is both a threat to stability and the only bargaining chip it holds against Israel in this context. For the United States, despite its military presence and political engagement, the war is just another military adventure.

From the above analysis, at least four conclusions can be drawn.

First and foremost, there is no military solution to what is essentially a political problem; force can only worsen matters. There was no Hezbollah before the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. There was no Hamas before the 1967 occupation. The list could go on. Every attempt to subjugate, oppress, or annihilate others or other nations leads to the pattern these movements embody.

Second, there are powerful actors on the ground driving more conflict. In Lebanon, some political figures have decided to align with Israel, which will inevitably provoke a reaction from Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Netanyahu—who has a strong interest in maintaining a “permanent war” until the Israeli elections in order to distract domestic public opinion and delay the legal proceedings against him—will continue to fuel tensions.

Third, Iran has not been attacked because it possesses nuclear weapons; rather, it has been targeted because it lacks them, making it a beatable target. The same applies to Lebanon; there is no chance for peace and stability as long as the country is seen as an easy target.

Last but not least, we have witnessed the limits of Israeli military power and the waning influence of some Gulf states that are entirely dependent on the US for security. Outsourcing security will never deliver an official, lasting peace in Lebanon and the wider region, but at best a strictly enforced “armed stability” or “militarized pacification.”

Achieving peace, which is often harder than winning militarily, requires a new negotiated regional order that is first and foremost accepted by the major powers and the parties in the region.